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Abstract
Did the “except for punishment for a crime” (exception punishment) clause o f the
first section o f the Thirteenth Amendment provide a platform for states to revise, and
create if necessary, laws to target blacks and imprison them, thus denying them their
rights and create a labor force through the agency o f mass incarceration? This author
begins with the assumption that it did. The purpose o f this thesis study is to explore this
question and find if the author’s assumption is correct - whether the exception
punishment clause permitted slavery and involuntary servitude to exist as a labor system
despite the intent o f the Thirteenth Amendment. This thesis begins with the exploration
of the Thirteenth Amendment and its relationship to systems o f involuntary servitude
from 1890-1920, which serves as the period covered for the duration o f the study. The
main intent of this study is to review the construction and meaning of the exception
punishment clause o f the Thirteenth Amendment; explore vagrancy laws; define peonage
as well as identify the conditions and the mechanics o f its perpetuation; and address as
well as discuss the role o f the state and state actors in peonage enforcement or the lack
thereof. Mississippi operates as the unit o f analysis for exploring the state statutes
regarding vagrancy. Alabama is the focus o f the exploration o f state and state actors
activity in peonage. Numerous cases are discussed to interpret the roles o f state and
federal governments. Most of the cases are federal in nature (two o f the cases are statelevel). The study ends with the author’s finding and determination o f his assumption.
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Introduction
Forms of involuntary servitude have been discussed by numerous scholars and
historians who have inquired about its existence after the ratification and adoption o f the
Thirteenth Amendment. Pete Daniel focuses on the life of peonage from the beginning o f
the twentieth century to 1969, which persisted under economic, political and legal
justification.1 Douglas Blackmon writes on the various forms, paying particular attention
to peonage and its legal counterpart, convict-leasing and discusses criminal-surety and
vagrancy.2 These systems often interlocked; however, they could also exist separately.
Why were these systems so difficult to eradicate, even after the adoption o f the
Thirteenth Amendment and the enactment additional legislation necessary to enforce the
Amendment?
This question has led to this author’s inquiry o f the “except as punishment for a
crime” clause (referred to as the punishment exception clause throughout the thesis) of
the Thirteenth Amendment to seek an answer. Was it possible that states may manipulate
through legislative enactments the punishment exception clause to target a population and
submit its members to slavery and involuntary servitude? Was there any motivation for
it? This author argues that there was an overuse o f police power, or manipulation of
legislative enactments to punish a target population, motivated by a desire to carry on the
social hierarchy of slave times.

1 See generally Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Chicago: University
of Illinois Press, 1972).
2 See generally Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The Re-Enslavement o f Black Americans
from the Civil War to World War II (Doubleday Broadway Publishing Group: New York, 2008).

9

10

Analysis and Method
This author has consulted and reviewed the Congressional Globe with particular
focus to the Thirty-Eighth and Thirty-Ninth Congresses, the Thirteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Government Archives online (www.archives.gov and
www.memory.loc.gov), the Government Publishing Office website (www.gpo.gov),
cases, the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, articles and law reviews. The cases, Peonage
Abolition Act, articles, and law reviews were accessed via JStor, Westlaw and
LexisNexis databases. The scope of the period covered is limited: 1890-1920. Any
information outside of this period is meant to support the viral persistence of involuntary
servitude in its various forms. One exception is the peonage story at the beginning of the
second chapter. The details help explain the depth and potency o f peonage as a system.
The study is broken down into an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion.
Three appendices are included to share with the reader primary documents as well as
supplementary information and sources. The thesis is completed with the bibliography,
which is categorized by type of source.
The first chapter explores public understanding, the Court’s doctrinal approach to
Thirteenth Amendment interpretation, and scholarly understanding o f the Thirteenth
Amendment - its power, reach, scope, interpretation, and application - with particular
attention to the punishment exception. Sources utilized are the Thirteenth Amendment
text as well as supporting articles from legal scholars to include Alvani Hasini, Steve A.
Howe, William M. Carter, Jr., George Rutherglen, and Darrell A. H. Miller. This chapter
is also informed by the historical works Paul Finkelman, Pete Daniel and Douglas
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Blackmon. Additional sources consulted were popular websites devoted to the
constitution as well as academic and educational material. The focus o f the first chapter is
on the punishment exception clause in the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment.
This author contends that the clause permitted slavery and involuntary servitude so long
as it was punishment for a crime for those duly convicted and the South took full
advantage o f the clause, criminalizing nearly every aspects of black life in the South.
Immigrants, briefly mentioned, are sure not to escape the entire conversation as they
suffered the plight of involuntary servitude masked as labor opportunities, though short in
comparison with African Americans.
The second chapter discusses vagrancy laws. While vagrancy laws operated as
one of the gateways through which a person could enter the punishment exceptionjustified slavery and involuntary servitude, it has a longer history than all other criminal
statutes enacted. Vagrancy is treated differently based on this fact and its association with
crimes against the public rather than a violation o f contractual obligation. This chapter
will explore vagrancy statutes, their enforcement by officers o f the law and judicial
administrators and their constitutionality based on U.S. courts’ jurisprudence, and
scholarly reasoning and interpretation. Attention to how Southern states used vagrancy
laws in support of the Black Codes is extremely important to this study, for it will
provide a fundamental understanding to its involvement in systems o f involuntary
servitude. Mississippi's vagrancy statutes will take the primary role in analysis.
For this chapter, the author has consulted and reviewed books, articles and law
reviews as well as statutes. The statutes, articles as law reviews were found in JStor,
Westlaw, and LexisNexis databases. The chapter provides a brief legal history o f
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vagrancy, which transitioned from the English legal system to the U.S. legal system as
well as a brief overview of the theories o f crime and their relation to social control. It also
analyzes vagrancy laws used in the post-Civil War South to provide an understanding of
how it operated within the context of the Thirteenth Amendment, if at all. The
interconnectedness and exchangeability between vagrancy and other systems of
involuntary servitude are intermittently referenced. Lastly, it reviews the constitutionality
of the vagrancy statutes, with attention to court rulings as well as constitutional attacks on
vagrancy laws. The table provided provides a simple visual o f the legal information
acquired from the law. The image o f the labor contract was adapted from the National
Archives webpage.
The third and final chapter focuses on peonage and its counterpart, the convict
leasing system. This author chiefly consults the works of Daniel, Blackmon and N.
Gordon Carper as well as the Congressional Globe and a series of peonage cases and
other laws pertaining to peonage. This chapter endeavors to explore the history o f
peonage in America from 1890-1920, to convey the legality, yet illegality, o f the peonage
and convict-leasing systems under the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and the Peonage Abolition Act (PAA). What were the conditions of peonage? How did
one enter into peonage? What was the socioeconomic atmosphere that contributed to
peonage? Who was principally affected, or victimized, by peonage? This study endeavors
to explore these questions and provide descriptions and responses to them. It also
discusses the existence of peonage as a form of involuntary servitude, its abolishment by
law, its perpetuation by local and state governments and the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions and doctrines that establish case law concerning peonage.
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Since peonage and vagrancy were different modes o f entry into involuntary
servitude, they are treated as such. Peonage primarily functioned under civil law whereas
vagrancy functioned under criminal law - one concerned private parties before the judge,
and the other was an exercise of state police power, characterized by public encounters of
law enforcement officials and private persons. Peonage resulted from both contract labor
drawn between an employer and laborer privately, or by sanction o f law. It is important
to note the distinctions and treat them differently based on those distinctions.

Chapter 1: The Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment is the first constitutional amendment that expanded
federal government power to regulate activities that were otherwise governed by states.
Slavery had existed before the founding fathers drafted the Constitution and the states
ratified it. States bickered over where slavery would legally exist - primarily in the
South. As citizens began to question the morality o f slavery, abolitionism grew and
spread as a movement. The issue, which became embedded in the fabric of the nation,
became one that tore the nation apart and sparked a war.
Not only did the controversy over the legal institution o f slavery disrupt social,
economic and moral life, it disrupted politics. Its virility incited secession. Southern
states began to secede and the remaining states’ representatives continued to debate the
political and legal status of slavery within the United States. Politicians mounted

’ Joe William Trotter, Jr., The African American Experience (Houghton Mifflin Co.: New York), 227-32.
See also Sandra L. Rierson, “The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution,” Vermont Law Review
35 (2011): 834-44.
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impassioned attacks against the institution o f slavery as well as in support o f it.4 The
stagnation of Congress on the issue became so politically disheartening that it prompted
President Lincoln to implore it to pass the amendment, which Congress passed one month
later.3 Exactly one year after Lincoln’s imploring, the Thirteenth Amendment became
part of the Constitution.6
The first clause prohibits the existence of slavery and involuntary servitude
anywhere within the United States, including its territories, it is not a question that the
Thirteenth Amendment was drafted to deal with the issue that was at hand at the time African enslavement (chattel slavery) in the U.S., but the language suggests that it is
reaches beyond chattel slavery and abolishes any system of involuntary servitude.

4 Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1863), 17-21. On December 14, 1863, Senator John P. Hale of
New Hampshire introduced a bill to quell the rebellion in the South, which declared equality among all
persons within the United States and abolished any claims to personal service with the exception of that
held in contractual obligation, parental claim to service performed by a child and service performed in
execution of a sentence for criminal punishment. Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois introduced a
similar bill. Lovejoy’s bill contained three sections: 1) forever abolish slavery and involuntary servitude
except as criminal punishment upon due conviction and declaration of those held in slavery or involuntary
servitude to be free; 2) provide protections to the freed person and give them legal rights - sue, be sued and
testify in court cases; and 3) criminalize the act of returning, or attempting to return, a person freed under
the act, subjecting offenders to an indictment and prosecution of a high misdemeanor and sentencing to be
limited to not less than one year but not to exceed five and a fine of $1,000 - $5,000. Representative James
F. Wilson of Iowa introduced a joint resolution in the House to submit to Congress, which was designed
with legislative intent to forever abolish slavery, permit involuntary servitude only as punishment for a
crime. The second section of the joint resolution gave Congress the power to enforce the first section
through the means of appropriate legislation. Each of these resolutions endeavored to bring an end to
slavery.
Ibid., 1489-1490. Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware rallied against an amendment that would abolish
slavery nationwide, reasoning that states retain the power to abolish slavery within their own territories. In
response, Saulsbury proposed an amendment himself. See Appendix I for text of Saulsbury's proposed
amendment.
5 Ibid., 2nd Sess. (1865), 3. Lincoln states, in his message to Congress, “At the last session of Congress a
proposed amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout the United States passed the
Senate, but failed for lack of the requisite two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives. Although, the
present is the same Congress, and nearly the same members, and without questioning the wisdom or
patriotism of those who stood in opposition, I venture to recommend the reconsideration and passage of the
measure at the present session. Of course the abstract question has not changed; but an intervening election
shows, almost certainly, that the next Congress will pass the measure if this one does not.”
6 U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation,
Centennial Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,” report prepared by
the Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 30.
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However, an important question has yet to be answered: What was meant by “except as
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted?” Or, more to
the point, how was it meant to be used as a public policy provision?7 The above clause is
similar to the exception clause in sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance (1787). What
motivated this clause to be included in the Ordinance? The Journals o f the Continental

Congress does not provide much on the matter. Article VI does not appear in the second
reading of the ordinance on July 11, 1787;

O

however, it appears on the day o f voting.

Q

Paul Finkelman notes that there was very little debate about including the
provision in the Ordinance. He suggests that no slavery in the Northwest Territory may
have been perceived as a benefit by the Southern states and thus permitted to be part of
the Ordinance.10 The clause that prohibited slavery also allowed for it, a contradiction
due to ambiguity. The lack of clarification, Finkelman argues, made it insufficient to deal
with the regulations of slave treatment and slave status.11 The incorporation o f this text
into the Thirteenth Amendment presents the same issue, which is discussed in the
‘Academic Understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment’ section.

7 U.S. Constitution, amend. 13, § 1.
8 U.S., Second Continental Congress, Journals o f the Continental Congress, Vol. 32 (1787), 333. The day
before, the draft had been revised and still the sixth article was nonexistent. See also Ibid., 319-20.
9 U.S., Second Continental Congress, Journals o f the Continental Congress, Vol. 32, 343.
10 Paul Finkelman, “Slavery and Bondage in the ‘Empire of Liberty’,” in The Northwest Ordinance: Essays
on Its Formation, Provisions and Legacy (Michigan State University Press: East Lansing, Michigan, 1989),
64-6. For more information on the sixth article of the Northwest Ordinance, see Peter Onuf, Statehood and
Union (Indiana University Press: Indianapolis), 110-13.
"Ibid., 66.
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Popular Understanding
Popular understanding focuses on the explicit language o f the Thirteenth
Amendment insofar as the prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude. However, the
punishment exception clause is not discussed much. Various sources available to the
public, influential in shaping and determining what the Thirteenth Amendment did,
describe the Amendment in part - possibly in an attempt to succinctly describe the intent
and purpose of the Amendment. Primary and secondary material relating to the
Thirteenth Amendment have expressed similar sentiments regarding the intent and
purpose of the Amendment. “ Contemporary government sources that discuss the
Constitution and the Amendments, available to the public, have reiterated this
understanding of the intent and purpose o f the Thirteenth Amendment.13
“History.com” also maintains this understanding o f the Amendment's intent abolition of slavery.

These sources are among the most sought by the American public,

which influence its conception of the intent and purpose o f Thirteenth Amendment.
These sources are correct, in part; however, each source neglects to mention or place any
emphasis on the limitation of the Amendment - the punishment exception clause. The
sources containing this explanation o f the Thirteenth Amendment are numerous; they

12 Various sources, which teachers may access to teach the American youth about the Thirteenth
Amendment, suggest that the Amendment abolished slavery. See Social Studies fo r Kids, “The Thirteenth
Amendment,” http://www.socialstudiesforkids.com/articles/ushistory/thirteenthamendment.htm, (accessed
April 6, 2016). See also, Craig Walenta, “The Constitution for Kids,” U.S. Constitution Online
http://www.usconstitution.net/constkids4.html (accessed April 6, 2016).
13 U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation,
30.
14 History.com, “Thirteenth Amendment,” A+E Digital Networks http://www.history.com/topics/blackhistory/thirteenth-amendment (accessed April 6, 2016).
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meet the citizenry before most other sources. Thus, the limitation is often neglected in
learning about and understanding the Thirteenth Amendment.

The Court’s Interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
Although ratified first, the Thirteenth Amendment (overshadowed by the
Fourteenth Amendment) remained in the bottom of the Court’s toolbox, only brought
under review when the Court deemed it necessary - a rare occasion.1'^ The first time it
received recognition by the Court was in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1872). While
Congress had been chiefly concerned with African enslavement and its abolition, the
Court expanded the definition of the Thirteenth Amendment to include “Mexican
Peonage” and the “Coolie labor system” in The Slaughterhouse Cases}6
The Court reasoned that these are systems o f involuntary servitude and that the
Amendment forbids involuntary servitude o f any nature, under any nam e.17 That is the
extent to which the Court interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court defined the
Thirteenth Amendment in response to the legal question at hand: whether a Louisiana law
granting a corporation exclusive rights to manage and control slaughterhouses, cattle
farms, and regulation of fees charged for renting out such premises that are otherwise
unavailable to any other enterprise performing in the same industry created a monopoly
and violated the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment and the first and second
sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. The challenger contended that the Louisiana law

15 Litigants would bring this up in cases, but in most cases, the Supreme Court would rule that the
Thirteenth Amendment did not apply.
16 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
17 Ibid.
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was an act that did violate these provisions. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that act
did not, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its decision.18
The next case the Court interpreted the meaning and power o f the Thirteenth
Amendment was the Civil Rights Cases (1883). The Court mentions that the first
provision is self-executing, meaning it does not need the aid of legislation for its force to
be realized.19 This case includes the first judicial mention o f “badges and incidents of
slavery,” which the Court construes to be a foundation for the congressional power
inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment. In this case, the Court tested the validity o f the

Civil Rights Act of 1875. The act forbade the denial o f equal accommodations in private
and public places, to include inns, railroad cars, and theatres. It sought to provide equal
social treatment among blacks and whites.
The Court struck down the sections (sections one and two), which ordered equal
accommodations and held that Congress, while having power to enact laws that are
necessary and proper to the enforcement o f the first section o f the Thirteenth
Amendment, cannot enact a law that prohibits denial o f equal accommodations that are
based on “mere discriminations on account or race or color” because they were not
regarded as badges of slavery.

This decision effectively gave rise to the legal enactment

18 See generally Slaughterhouse Cases.
19 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
20 Civil Rights Cases, 25. See also U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f
America: Analysis and Interpretation, Centennial Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States of America,” report prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 1793.
The report explains that the Court perceived the badges and incidents and slavery to be denial of certain
rights (rights of civil freedom) - the right to: marry; sue in court; be sued; testify; submit evidence; inherit;
draft, sign and enforce contracts; and purchase, sell, lease and convey property, which were subject to
congressional power; however equal access to accommodation and places of public amusement were not
included in the package of badges and incidents of slavery.
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of Jim Crow policies. Southern states could resume a social hierarchy akin to that of
slavery, interrupted by Radical Reconstruction.
Laws that protected the chastity o f white women from black men were enacted.
Accusations of black men were often invoked to either criminalize black men or kill
them." However, sexual aggression o f white men toward black women were justified by
the rationalization that suggested black women loved to engaged in adulterous acts with
white men and thus, they could not claim rape." Miscegenation laws were aimed at black
23

men."' Such a faulty notion of black women influenced the legal perception o f black
women who were raped.
As already established, the badges and incidents of slavery is a foundation of
congressional power inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment. Since the Court did not view
the racial discrimination as such, it did not fall within the scope o f congressional power
granted by the Thirteenth Amendment. Social attitudes of the time played a role in the
decision of the Court. As legal scholar William M. Carter, Jr. argues, interest
convergence is a great contributor to positive applications of the Thirteenth Amendment
in cases where it is brought as a claim.24 In the Civil Rights Cases, the law did not
converge with the interest of the dominant class in society. Thus the Thirteenth
Amendment was not positively applied; instead, the Court found that it did not apply.23

21 Blackmon, 100.
22 Ibid., 305.
23 Ibid., 100.
24 See generally William M. Carter, Jr., “The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges
and Incidents of Slavery,” Maryland Law Review 71, no. 21 (2011).
2" Civil Rights Cases, 25-6. The Court did recognize that the force of the 13th and 15th amendments could
exercise power over equal rights: “Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as
badges of slavery. If, since that time, the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respects has become
established by constitutional amendment, it is not by the force of the Thirteenth Amendment (which merely
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Hence, the Court acknowledges in its definition the congressional power to prohibit by
enactment of law anything reminiscent of slavery, but it did not include in its
interpretation racial discrimination. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson remark that the
jurispathic treatment of the Thirteenth Amendment by the Court is predicated upon not
wanting to establish precedent that would disrupt the social, political and economic
atmospheres of the time.

26

The limitation on the congressional power granted by the Thirteenth Amendment
in the Civil Rights Cases provided a basis to permit the separate but equal doctrine
established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).27 The Court cites the proposition presented in
the Civil Rights Cases as support that the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment does not
extend to exercise power over social relations.28 It reasons that Congress does not have
the power nor does the Thirteenth Amendment contain the force to end racial prejudices
or forbid distinctions based on physical appearance. Thus, laws enforcing separate but
equal remained constitutional until the Court overruled the decision in Brown v. Board o f

Education o f Topeka (1954), which determined that separate but equal was
unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause.29 Such laws permitted

abolishes slavery), but by force of the Thirteenth and Fifteen Amendments.” Thus, a combination of the
two in a claim maybe prevented sections one and two from being declared invalid.
26 Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment,” Columbia Law Review
112, no. 7, (2012): 1464-1469.
27 See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This case is about a man that is prosecuted under
a Louisiana statute because he refused to remove himself from a railroad car reserved for whites. The
statute required that railroad companies provide difference cars for black persons and white person while
providing separate but equal accommodations. Nurses accompanying children of other races was an
exception to the segregated railroad cars.
28 Plessy, 542-43.
29 See generally Brown v. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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and reinforced Jim Crow, perpetuating the suffering o f blacks at the hands o f Southern
whites.30
The subject of labor contracts fell within Thirteenth Amendment exceptions. One
case in which the Court identified the inapplicability o f the Thirteenth Amendment was

Robertson v. Baldwin (1897). Four sailors had been working for a commercial liner,
Arago, when they became discontent with their employment. They departed from a port
in San Francisco, made a stop in Washington, at a port in Knappton, and continued to
other ports. Somewhere along this tour, the sailors became dissatisfied with their
employment and departed the ship in Astoria, Oregon.
There, they were arrested for desertion. They were tried and sentenced to
imprisonment until the Arago was ready to depart again. Sixteen days later, when the
Arago had been prepared for departure, a marshal escorted the sailors from jail back to
the commercial liner. They refused to return to work but remained on board the ship.
They had made it to San Francisco, the place where they would be arrested and charged
with refusal to work. They sued on a writ o f habeas corpus, which was dismissed upon
hearing by the California district court. The court also issued an order that remanded the
sailors to return to the custody of the marshal who had escorted them. They petitioned to
the U.S. Supreme Court.31
The Court noted that the reach o f the Thirteenth Amendment is extended to public
and private service; however, it stated that maritime service is an exception, created by a
labor contract in which the sailor surrenders his personal liberty to serve on the high

j0 Walter F. Murphy et al., American Constitutional Interpretation, 3ld ed. (Foundation Press: New York,
2003), 908.
31 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 275-77 (1897).
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seas.32 It reasoned that since the legislation punishing members who desert and are absent
without leave had existed some 60 years before the constitutional adoption o f the
Thirteenth Amendment, it is doubtful that the amendment was drafted with the intent to
apply to labor contracts. The Court ruled that maritime labor contracts do not fall within
the scope of involuntary servitude/3 Thus, it affirmed the decision and had restricted the
reach of the Thirteenth Amendment to labor contracts.
Labor contracts became subject to scrutiny when they did bring about a condition
of peonage, which the Court correctly identified as involuntary servitude. Peonage,
coerced or compulsive labor served to liquidate a debt, was outlawed yet it flourished in
the Southern states.34 The first time it had come under legal scrutiny was in 1902. The
Court established, in Clyatt v. United States (1905), the validity o f the Peonage Abolition
Act of 1867, holding positively that the Thirteenth Amendment did apply and that the Act
was constitutional (this case will be discussed more in the chapter on peonage)/'’ The
stark contrast, as legal scholar and attorney Cynthia A. Bailey notes, was the Court's
interpretation of involuntary servitude in the Clyatt case. In Clyatt, the Court found that
the nature of service was essential to determining involuntary servitude.

The nature of

the contract determined in Clyatt was contrary to the Court’s criteria for involuntary
servitude in Robertson, which looked at the mode of origin. It would not be until the

j2 Robertson, 282.
” Robertson, 287-88.
,4 Black’s Law’ Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “involuntary servitude5' defines the term as “The condition of one
who is compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor to another, whether he
is paid or not.55 Thus, involuntary servitude includes chattel slavery, among other forms like peonage, and
convict-leasing.
j5 See generally Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
36 Cynthia A. Bailey, “Workfare and Involuntary Servitude - What You Wanted to Know but Were Afraid
to Ask,” Boston College Third World Law Journal 15, no. 2 (1995): 319.
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surge of peonage cases that the Court would reassess its approach towards labor
contracts.

Academic Understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment
Collegiate-level textbooks that inform the academic mind have followed the same
notions as popular understanding. Darlene Clark Hine’s The African American Odyssey
notes that the Amendment was ratified in 1865 and outlawed slavery.

The American

Promise, a history textbook, shares the same message - the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery. 8 Harrison and Harris's American Democracy Now also notes that the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery.39 Freedom On My Mind: A History o f African

Americans, with Documents, also acknowledges the abolition o f slavery throughout the
United States.40
The discourse between members o f the academic community engaging each other
in scholarly discussion has focused more on the type o f rights the Thirteenth Amendment
establishes.41 In establishing the context through which they debate the meaning and

’7 Darlene Clark Hine, The African American Odyssey, 5th ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 2011), 312.
’8 James L. Roark, The American Promise: A History o f the American People, Volume II: From 1865 (New
York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2005), 567. Also, see table on p. 576.
Brigid Harrison, Jean Wahl Harris and Michelle D. Deardorff, American Democracy Now, 2nd ed. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2011), 75, See note in side tab. The authors also note the Thirteenth Amendment to be
the legal end to slavery on p. 99.
40 Deborah Gray White, Mia Bay, Waldo Martin, Jr., Freedom on My Mind: A History o f African
Americans, with Documents (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013), 347.
41 In January 2012, a symposium, hosted by Columbia Law Review, explored doctrinal relationship of the
Thirteenth Amendment to concepts of liberty and equality. A number of historians, political scientists and
legal scholars participated in intellectual discourse to better understand the doctrinal relevance of the
Thirteenth Amendment to such concepts and their relationship to contemporary issues. The participants
include Jack Balkin, Sanford Levinson, Mark A. Graber, George Rutherglen, Alexander Tsesis, Jennifer
Mason McAward, Rebecca Zietlow, Eric Foner, Aviam Soifer, Darrell A. H. Miller, William M. Carter, Jr.,
Richard Delgado and Andrew Koppelman.
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scope, they appeal to the historic nature and origin o f the Thirteenth Amendment - meant
to address American chattel slavery. Slavery, however, becomes another topic of debate.
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson explore the “danger" (their use of quotations
around the term indicate misapplication) associated with the Thirteenth Amendment.42
They maintain that the Amendment’s restrictive interpretation is based on the possible
threat it poses to political and market/commercial interests and practices if construed
broadly. Balkin and Levinson finds an issue to be the contemporary connotation and
association of the term slavery, which, according to them, is narrow in its content of
historical practices and thus, anachronistic.43 They maintain that slavery meant something
different in colonial America because it included in its definition the following: 1)
illegitimate domination - wrongly acquired position o f agency over an individual; 2)
political subordination - lack of political equality (and political voice) between members
of society; and 3) the absence of republican government - lack o f political representation.
Chattel slavery, which shapes the contemporary notion o f slavery, is a most extreme
example of the slavery understood in colonial times.44 This distinction leads them to
inquire about the interpretive nature o f the Thirteenth Amendment, which has language
adopted from the Northwest Ordinance (1787) that predates the Constitution. They
suggest that if construed in the colonial context, there is a possibility that the
Amendment’s prohibition may apply to a variety o f social and civil ills. 45

42 Balkin and Levinson, 1470-1477.
43 See generally Balkin and Levinson, 1459-1499.
44 Ibid., 1482-1485.
45 Ibid., 1470-1471. Balkin and Levinson suggest that slavery was repugnant to the Founding Fathers’ ideal
of republican government. They find that since the punishment exception clause was adopted from the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the meaning of slavery ought to have been adopted as well.
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This broad definition in application to the Thirteenth Amendment provides an
array of activities that may be considered to be slavery. More importantly, it suggests that
criminal conviction would forfeit the protection against slavery against more than the
extreme conditions commonly associated with chattel slavery.46 This implicit notion is
concurrent with Scott Howe’s originalist interpretation o f the punishment exception
clause. This type of interpretation focuses on reading the text within the context o f the
how the text was understood by the public when it was originally presented and published
- its historical context. Howe focuses on how, if using the originalist interpretation, the
punishment exception clause permits slavery and involuntary servitude that would be
otherwise prohibited by the remaining text o f the Amendment. He notes the basis for
reading the punishment exception clause in this manner: proponents of the antislavery
measure did not specify a limited definition nor did Northwest Ordinance provide a
specific definition.47 Howe observes an applicable rule to how the clause should be read
in District o f Columbia v. Heller (2008) - the clause must be interpreted by its original
meaning among ordinary citizens o f the time, which he finds permits slavery and
involuntary servitude.48 Although Howe argues that the challenges o f an originalist
interpretation of the punishment exception clause cannot be overcome, in a convincing
manner, his work alludes to the 38th Congress’s yield to a clause that enables both slavery
and involuntary servitude to be modes of punishment for the government to utilize,

46 Ibid., 1475-1477, 1484.
47 Scott W. Howe, “Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and
the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment,” Arizona Law Review 51 (Winter, 2009): 990-91.
48 Ibid., 990. The term this author uses, “punishment exception clause,” is synonymous with Howe’s
“slavery-as-punishment” term. Both terms reference the same clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.
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should it decide to do so. In effect, by the originalist interpretation o f the Thirteenth
Amendment, slavery nor involuntary servitude is completely abolished.
While Howe discusses the legislative history leading up to the passage and the
ratification containing the punishment exception clause, Alvaro Hasini recaps a piece o f
legislative history post-ratification o f the Thirteenth Amendment. Two years after the
ratification of the Amendment, Representative John A. Kasson of Iowa introduced a
resolution to the House to resolve the issue o f the vagueness inherent in the punishment
clause in response to an advertisement which contained in bold print the selling of
negroes as punishment for a crime.49 The resolution sought to define the clause by
limiting control of prisoners to the official capacity o f the government and the class of
servitude to be performed by convicts would be limited to imprisonment or servitude the condition of involuntary servitude must directly correlate with the criminal conviction
and punishment, if including hard labor in “the regular and ordinary course of law” in the
sentence is extent to which such a punishment would be constitutional.50 The resolution
passed the House; however, it failed to pass the Senate. Since the resolution failed in the
Senate, the meaning of the clause remained unchanged/1 Hasini argues that prisoners are
exempted from slavery and involuntary servitude that are not directly related to the prison
sentence of the convicted. He applies this argument to the situation o f prison sexual
slavery - ‘stronger’ inmates subjecting ‘weaker’ inmates to badges and incidents of
slavery.

49 Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1867), 344-45.
50 Alvaro Hasini, “You Are Hereby Sentenced to a Term of... Enslavement?: Why Prisoners Cannot Be
Exempt from the Thirteenth Amendment,” Barry Law Review 18 (Spring, 2013): 285-86.
51 Ibid., 286.
52 Ibid., 290.
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Pete Daniel’s The Shadow o f Slavery sheds light on peonage as it operated
throughout the Progressive Era to the Civil Rights Era, where his study ends and peonage
cases were no longer in focus.53 He begins with the story surrounding United States v.

Clyatt (1905) - a case that lasted for eight years (it was remanded and sent back to the
lower courts for rehearing and the Justice Department held on to the prosecution until the
one who brought the case requested it be dropped). Daniel discussed the trajectory, sure
to note the success and failure of the case. The success was the validity o f the Peonage

Abolition Act of 1867 (PAA), yet Clyatt was acquitted on a technicality and prosecution
had failed.^4
Daniel also discusses what constituted peonage, how it managed to operate
though outlawed, the patterns it operated in and where, methods by which one was placed
in peonage and who it affected. The primary targets were blacks, followed by
immigrants. Peonage succeeded slavery as a system o f bondage. Those sucked into the
“vortex of peonage,” as Daniel calls it, suffered tremendously. Poor whites suffered from
its effects on the labor economy as well. Daniel also discusses the social, economic, and
political factors that impacted the South and cultivated peonage. Debt, imposed over and
over again, replaced the legal status o f slavery in that one was compelled to service.
Between the Freedmen's Bureau, the U.S. Army (who lost the drive to protect freedmen
after a while) and the lack of capital and land, peons became ensnared in a system of
peonage. Contracts ensured the laborers employment, but they also risked entanglement

53
54

See generally Pete Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery’.
Ibid.
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into a system of neo-slavery and the ultimate price to be employed could carry serious
consequences, as it often did.55
Throughout his work, Daniel recounts peonage cases, some of which revealed
how employers and justices of peace would collaborate to keep peons in bondage. One of
the cases conveys the lengths that some employers would go - pretend to be an official
court and have a peon (in the case he highlights, the peon was black) under the
impression that his term of employment was extended by the court.56 Other methods that
Daniel presents are practices used to compel a person to become a peon: falsely charge
the employee and told him that the only mode o f evasion was to sign a labor contract;
judges issuing fines to poor persons knowing that they could not pay; and laws that
infringed upon the laborer’s right to quit and work elsewhere without notifying the
current employer.57
Daniel dedicates one chapter to tell the story about Alonzo Bailey and his journey
before the Supreme Court twice, in 1908 and 1911, to free himself of the conditions of
peonage.'8 Daniel also discusses how the South lured immigrants with advertisements of
“the land where it never snows.”59 Northern labor agents played an active role in
recruiting and transporting immigrant labor to the South, where the immigrant laborers
would be promised quality working conditions; the reality when they arrived was far
from what they were promised.60 Prosecution o f peonage violators in the immigrant

35 Ibid., 19-42. Peonage spread across the South in three forms: cotton farms, turpentine farms and naval
stores, and railroad construction camps.
56 Ibid., 51-2.
57 Ibid., 47-8.
58 Ibid., 65-81.
59 Ibid., 82.
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peonage cases were less successful than the cases o f black peons, but immigrant peonage
cases declined in 1910, which left peonage to the blacks.61
Peonage, as Daniel explains, was hard to root out. It was embedded in social
custom and perceived as a social norm. Anyone who dared challenge it would be receive
retaliation.62 Although the PAA abolished peonage, it flourished anyway. States passed
labor-contract laws to protect the interest o f the employers and disadvantaged the
laborers. Employers would also sabotage prosecutions by making witnesses disappear or
through acts of bribery.

Moreover, the narrowness of the PAA presented prosecuting

attorneys with a nearly impossible challenge. Although Bailey caused a period of
cessation in peonage claim in Alabama, the claims reemerged, though most were
dismissed on technicalities or lack of witnesses. By 1920, peonage seemed more visible,
but there were fewer complaints, according to Daniel. ~ Nonetheless, peonage remained
as strong as its predecessor, slavery; it was protected and nourished by local law
enforcement, judicial officials and sympathetic juries and fortified by custom. It reigned
supreme with little federal interference.66
Douglas A. Blackmon began his research under a separate, yet related inquiry - in
applying the lens of historical confrontation used to examined the benefits reaped by
German corporations and Swiss banks from actions committed toward the victims of the
Holocaust to American corporations, what would be revealed?67 His exploration led to
him to findings that inextricably linked such corporations to the nation’s history of
61 Ibid., 106-7.
62 Ibid., 7-12, 147.
63 Ibid., 14, 108.
64 Ibid., 108, 138.
65 Ibid., 145-48.
66 Ibid., 148.
67 Blackmon, 3.
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compulsory labor. Slavery by Another Name examines the multiple forms o f involuntary
slavery, which succeeded slavery. Blackmon does so by identifying the practices that
were the same under slavery and the systems o f involuntary servitude it bore post-Civil
War. One such practice was the leasing o f slaves as human capital and labor. This
practice existed before the Civil War, carried through the Civil War and when slavery
was abolished, it carried on under the moniker o f convict-leasing, which often led to debt
slavery, introduced through vagrancy and reinforced by the practices o f peonage and
criminal-surety. Among its participants were industrial actors, such as Tredegar Iron
Works and Brierfield Iron Works.68
Although Blackmon’s story centers on forced laborer Green Cottinham, he
discusses the history of slavery and its impact on Cottinham. Moreover, he provides an
account of slavery - plantation and industrial - and the transition o f its badges, incidents,
vestiges and relics, deeply woven into the social fabric of the South post-Civil War that
emerged into the various forms of involuntary servitude. Clothed in custom, supported by
rationalizations and economic dependence, protected by legal structures and violent acts
of Southern whites, forced labor had lived long after the Thirteenth Amendment’s
abolition. He references the punishment exception clause and briefly discusses its
implications on this system.69
Blackmon discusses the similarities between slavery and the convict-leasing
system and prison conditions of convicts that were leased. He identifies former slave
masters that became heavily involved with and greatly influenced the judicial
administrative system. Former slave masters would become justices o f peace as well as
68 Ibid., 15-21.
69 Ibid., 53. Blackmon makes a clear reference to the punishment exception.
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store owners and persons with commercial interests in the developing industrial complex,
which depended on raw materials mined, which in turned depended on cheap labor
inevitably provided by those convicted of crimes.70
Like slaves, convicts could be leased out. Debts operated as tradable units - they
could be sold at a full or discounted price or swapped. Sheriffs operated as slave masters
would, exercising authority over the leasing of convicts. Judges, not paid by the county,
received their wages by assessing court fees. Fees also paid law enforcement officers,
certain court officials and witness that testified. Often, black offenders, possessing little
money and property, could not pay. Summary proceedings took precedence over trials as
each official act exercised by sheriffs, court official and judges were combined with fines
and penalties ordered by the judge. They were either sent to prison and leased out or a
person would act as surety, taking responsibility for the financial obligation and ensuring
good behavior of the convicted.71 In a system rested upon summary proceedings, records
were ill-maintained. It was not uncommon for a convict (or an alleged convict) to have no
record as a convict, though laboring as one.

72

Mine and prison camps contained horrid conditions. Convicts were flogged for
resisting orders,

whipped, and received water torture when whippings or floggings were

deemed ineffective; much of these punishments were performed while the convicts were

70 Ibid., 63-78.
7' Ibid., 61-6.
2 Ibid., 76, 109. Reginald Dawson, chief prison inspector of Alabama in 1883, discovered a number of
convict laborers held by at the Newcastle and Coalburg prison mines that had not been paid for nor listed
on prison rosters that were required to be maintained by law (p. 76). Thomas Parke, a health officer in
Jefferson County of Alabama, visited another Coalburg mine and noted that the records of at least 500
convict laborers did not exist in the official state records (p. 109).
73 Ibid., 373.
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under restraint.74 Scant clothing, poorly maintained sleeping quarters, little or no medical
attention and treatment, and meager rations were provided to the convict laborers. The
lack of adequate needs to be provided by the employer in exchange for labor prompted
the untimely expiration of the laborers - their value less than that o f slaves as they could
be replaced cheaply and the criminal system ensured adequate supply.73
Often, those running the farms, mines and prison camps falsely proclaimed that
the convict laborers were cared for and well-maintained; furthermore, they fired back
with statements that blamed the black convict laborers for their own maltreatment and
demise.76 Such claims were contended by government and medical officials appalled by
what they had witnesses; however, such claims had little bearing on convict-labor
conditions.77 Most significantly, and implicitly, Blackmon argued convict-leasing as a
form of peonage sanctioned by the state and its government officials through criminal

74 Ibid., 71.
7? Ibid., 75-8, 96, 108-10,135. Dawson began inspection visits to state prisons. The legislature engaged in
this investigation to preserve the practice of convict-leasing rather than out of concern for the treatment of
the convicts. Throughout these inspections, Dawson witnessed deplorable acts of inhumane treatment and
no effective change upon return visits. In response, he made recommendations to revamp the convict
leasing program, but such implored recommendations went largely ignored (pp. 75-8).
Blackmon states, “slaves of the earlier era were at least minimally insulated physical harm by their intrinsic
value. Their owners could borrow money with slaves as collateral, pay debts with them, sell them at a
profit, or extend the investment through production or more slave children. But the convicts of the new
system were of value only as long as their sentences or physical strength lasted. If they died while in
custody, there was no financial penalty to the company leasing them. Another black laborer would always
be available from the state or a sheriff. There was no compelling reason no to tax these convicts to their
actual physiological limits” (p. 96).
Their owner Parke observed the primitive sleeping quarters of the convict laborers, onerous work days and
lack of medical care afforded to the convict laborers. He also found a large number of the laborers died due
to the overall conditions. The greatest effect of the criticism was embarrassment of those leasing convicts
(p. 108- 10).

A medical inspector reported to the Board of Inspectors of Convicts, the same agency of which Dawson
was chief inspector, that he found a man to have died of frostbite to his feet, which lacked protection (socks
and shoes; some had the little protection of was wrapped around their feet) from the cold (p. 135).
76 Ibid., 109.
77 Ibid., 75-8, 108-10,135
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prosecution and conviction; involuntary servitude was initiated through the nexus of
minor offenses to vagrancy laws and other criminal statutes.

78

Darrell A. H. Miller explores the concept o f custom and its relevance to the
meaning and scope of the Thirteenth Amendment. Custom, he explains, has contextual
meaning and has existed in various forms in the American nation. He states custom as a
source of law before the generation of positive law, suggesting instances and
circumstances in which private actions were predicated on customary law rather than
positive law, such as right to abortion, bear arms and sovereign immunity o f states from
its citizens. He also discusses other contexts in which custom exists: cultural, social and
behavioral norms, and as a legal source o f common and legislated law.

Customs, in

these contexts, influenced and continues to influence laws and jurisprudence without
having to be memorialized in texts.
Custom, he maintains, helped to support and reinforce slavery. The cultural
implications of internalized customs, as well as external social customs, placed free
blacks in danger of experiencing the conditions of chattel slavery.

Custom provided the

foundation for laws, and often materialized into legislative enactments, to protect slaveowner interests;

and sometimes, it functioned, when integrated into statutes, to restricts

customary practices (i.e. legal mandates o f manumission to slaves that converted to
O ')

Christianity).

The practice of racial solidarity among whites, although working and not

part of the slave-owning class, to discriminate against blacks operated within the context

78 See generally Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name.
79 Ibid., 1814-1815.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 1825, 1830.
82 Ibid. 1824-1825
83 Ibid., 1827-1828.
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of custom, as did keeping slaves in compliance (and not revolt) and ensuring that blacks
did not disrupt or incite disruptions.84 According to Miller, custom had three implications
on the American legal institution. It provided justifications to treat humans as property,
legitimized morally abhorrent slavery, and influenced resistance to legal abolition of
slavery were predicated on social, cultural and behavioral norms. '

Southern Resistance
Hasini, Daniel, Blackmon and Miller each hint on Southern resistance to federal
laws, and the flawed construction o f the Thirteenth Amendment and synchronicity of the
punishment exception clause with its then-current legal practice. Representative Kassan
had seen an advertisement that sought to utilize the punishment exception clause to suit
commercial interests and reinforce white supremacy,

supported by rationalized

ideological structures that whites were to be respected and feared by whites that had long
pervaded the antebellum slavery period. This observation promoted a reaction on his
behalf to introduce a joint resolution to define, and thereby restrict, the police power to be
exercised by state governments that may seek to oppress and marginalized the
disadvantaged blacks that were recently emancipated.

As Hasini explains, the resolution

saw a cease to its momentum in the Senate where it was stopped indefinitely.
Stephen Kantrowitz notes in Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction o f White

Supremacy that the resistance to Reconstruction in the South was underway before the
84 Ibid., 1832.
85 Ibid., 1834.
86 Congressional Globe, 39lh Cong., 2nd Sess. (1867), 345. The clerk of the House reads the advertisement,
“NEGROES SOLD AS PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME.’
87 Ibid.
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Radical Republicans had begun their reconstruction.

oo

Benjamin Tillman, renowned

racist and white supremacist Southern politician, led an activist agenda to nullify federal
power and implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment and the legislation that passed
from it.

One Southern delegate rationalized and justified Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

intimidation, stating that the KKK was acting as a vigilante group intent upon punishing
the black criminal that the Republican authorities would not. 90 Punishment for crime was
Governor Tillman’s message to South Carolinian white men. He deplored lynching,
which was often carried out as entertainment or for imagined socio-legal violations of
racial respect. Punishment for a crime was to replace outright murders. Lynching reduced
the number of black laborers available to agricultural employers, like Tillman, and drove
up the price of labor.91
Miller’s examination of custom is a pertinent subject to exploring conduct that
undermines the power and reach o f the Thirteenth Amendment. It is what is invoked by
Daniel and Blackmon as a protective force o f systems o f involuntary servitude. Daniel
and Blackmon challenged the established view o f the Thirteenth Amendment’s protection
by exposing systems of involuntary servitude that operated under the protection state
criminal laws as well as custom. Blackmon even makes mention o f the punishment
exception as the one apparatus in which slavery and involuntary could continue to exist.
The very construction of the Amendment permits slavery and involuntary servitude so

88 Stephen Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction o f White Supremacy (The University of North
Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000), Kindle Edition, Location I 132 of 10238.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 1253-1254 of 10238.
91 Ibid., 3463 of 10238.
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long as it is punishment for a crime upon one who has been duly convicted. States
exercise police powers to convict those within its bounds o f crimes.
Coupled with custom, the Southern States undermined the Thirteenth Amendment
and clung to systems of bondage to preserved their beloved social hierarchy. Thus,
peonage, abolished by the PAA, remained alive and thriving in Southern states, protected
by state laws;92 and vagrancy laws, often invoked as states’ police power to regulate
criminal activity, remained untouched by the Court until 1972.

The systems persisted

and the federal government, by error o f legislative construction and design, was limited
in its power to end it. The South saw it and took advantage of the opportunity inherent in
the punishment exception clause.

Chapter 2: Vagrancy
It is a widely held historical fact that the Jim Crow era was one in which nearly
every aspect of black life was criminalized in the U.S. Crimes for disrespect of white
women, adultery - which was disparagingly applied towards black men, carrying a
weapon, taking work elsewhere without a written document o f employment termination
by previous employer, failure to obtain a labor contract by a state-mandated deadline and
vagrancy, which was defined so equivocally that an offender can be in violation for
nearly anything.94 Vagrancy was the easiest tool o f the state in gathering criminals. Once
gathered and convicted, the court could lease them out.

92 See generally Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery.
9' Papachristou v. City o f Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
94 Blackmon, 53-4.
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Often when people think of crimes, they think of robbery, arson, murder, treason,
etc.; however, vagrancy is not a crime that comes to the forefront when considering
criminal conduct. Why is that? As Forrest W. Lacey states, “vagrancy is the principle
crime in which the offense consists o f being a certain kind o f person rather than having
done or failed to do certain acts.”9^ Often crime is associated with action or inaction;
however, the association is linked to one class of crime. Vagrancy is in the class o f crime
that identifies with personal condition rather than action or inaction.
Crimes of personal condition are a peculiar class o f legal violations that have been
grandfathered into the U.S. legal and criminal justice system from the English legal and
criminal justice system.96 It appears to have been necessary as England attempted to
deport vagrants to Virginia.97 Aware o f vagrancy in England, it is possible that Virginia
adopted such laws for similar reasons, to regulate movement of the unemployed and
those that did not own land, provide a sufficient pool o f cheap laborers and prevent

95 Forrest W. Lacey, “Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition,” Harvard Law Review 66, no. 7
(1953): 1203.
96 See Lacey, 1206. Lacey states, “vagrancy legislation in the United States which began in colonial times,
closely follows English models.” See also Arthur H. Sherry, “Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds - Old
Concepts in Need of Revision,” California Law Review 48, no. 4 (1960): 557-58. Sherry traces vagrancy
back to terminology, vagrom men, used in William Shakespeare’s Much Ado about Nothing reflecting the
presence of vagrancy in 14th-century England. The term is a classifying nomenclature of men had a
personal condition that was considered immorally criminal. Sherry identifies the notion behind English
vagrancy law that transitioned into American vagrancy law, which is a person whose rights are guaranteed,
or supposed to be guaranteed, by the government is still subject to criminal punishment “by virtue of
personal condition or of belonging to a particular class.” See also Robin Yeamans, “Constitutional Attacks
on Vagrancy Laws,” Stanford Law Review>20, no. 4 (1968): 782. Yeamans also traces the origins of
vagrancy to 14th-century England, not by review of theatrical manuscripts, but by identification of the law,
the first Statute of Labourers, which, as she suggests, limited the movement of the unemployed and those
who did not own land for purposes of fortifying the English feudal structure and securing a sufficient pool
of laborers that would work for cheap following the Black Plague. See also C.J. Ribton-Turner, A History
o f Vagrants and Vagrancy and Beggars and Begging (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith Publishing Co.,
1972), 3. Ribton-Turner assumes from inference regarding the “axioms of law” that vagrancy existed as
early as the Anglo-Saxon rule over the Isles, currently known as the U.K., premised upon why laws are
created - not in anticipation for wrongs that have a possibility or probability of occurring, but as a remedy
for wrongs that are already existent.
97 Ribton-Turner, 141.
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crime.98 A Virginia court, in 1937, defended the state’s vagrancy statutes. Its defense
makes one wonder: how is it that vagrancy laws fit into a system that is supposed to
permit one pursue life, liberty, and property, which may be deprived with due process o f
law?

History of Vagrancy Laws
The origins of vagrancy laws are oriented in fourteenth-century England. Legal
scholars and historians identify the first written record as the first Statute o f Labourers.99
In 1348, Black Death, which originated in the East and stormed all o f Europe, appeared
in England. The aftermath included a labor shortage as the population had been
devastated. Another effect of the Black Death aftermath was a shift in labor economics;
laborers charged high wages for their labor as they emerged with labor economics in their
favor. With prices for their services high and the supply of laborers numerous, laborers
became idle. Their idleness gave rise to other issues.100
The Black Death aftermath and laborers’ idleness created an uneasy atmosphere
for landowners and employers; it created economic and social disorder. Thus, Parliament
found it necessary to enact a legal tool - vagrancy - to help regulate the economic issues
of labor supply and wage compensation for labor, as well as socially unacceptable
behavior of the laborers.101 The tool was the Statute o f Laborers, which provided in detail
what is expected of laborers and a mechanism for labor control, which provided support

98 Sherry, 1206; Yeamans, 782.
99 Emphasis added to “first” as there are subsequent statutes under the same title. See footnote 96.
100 Ribton-Tumer, 42-4. The author does not specify what the other disorders are (this author references
those disorders as issues); however, this author believes it to be criminal activity - i.e. prostitution, theft,
loitering, begging, etc. - as the following section of the author’s narrative quotes the Statute o f Laborers,
which discusses the other issues further.
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for the feudal-type system that had been in place.

“ The ordinance, which later came to

be held as statute by authority of 2 Rich. II, Stat. 1, c. 8 (1378) was the tool enacted by
Parliament; its preamble reads as follows;
Because a great part of the people, and especially of workmen and servants, late
died of the pestilence, many seeing the necessity of masters and great scarcity of
servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive wages, and some rather
•
•
•
•
1 AO
willing to beg in idleness than by labour to get their living...
The preamble was a direct response to the social and economic phenomenon that
England had been experiencing. It was drafted with the purpose of addressing the
economic turmoil that emerged from laborers who sought higher wages for their work
and contributed to the surplus of unemployed laborers. The preamble continued on to
declare that every able-bodied individual within England, up to the age of sixty that was
not a merchant, did not have a craft (i.e. masonry, smithing, etc.), live on his own land, or
right to his own land where he may live and not in service to a master already, be bound
to serve if he or she was required to serve. Should a person not have completed his or her
time of service under the terms of the agreement, he (or she) would be imprisoned.104 The
preamble, which became law in 1378 as mentioned above, had, in effect, sought to ensure
laborers were 'contributing their part' to the labor economic system. The law was meant
to reinforce the socioeconomic status and position o f the aristocracy, landowners, and
masters, and to keep the laborers in a position to labor only. Furthermore, it created a
degree of involuntary servitude that was punishable by law - imprisonment for failure to
complete service under contracted terms, or more simply, a breach o f contract.
102 Ribton-Turner, 43; See also Sherry, 558.
103 2 Rich. Stat. 1, c. 8 quoted in Ribton-Turner, 43.
104 Ibid., 43-4. This author finds a similarity, if not a predisposition in the law, to peonage support by
breach of contract, which also seeps into the American legal system. See also University of Missouri, St.
Louis, Statute o f Labourers, 135 f http://www.umsl.edu/~gradyf/medieval/statute.htm (accessed Dec. 11,
2015).
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Vagrancy laws were designed as a legal tool of social behavioral and economic
control. English vagrancy laws had three functions: control the labor market, add to and
support poor relief laws, and prevent incidents of criminal activity.105 As English
colonists began to settle in the New World, they carried with them vagrancy laws, among
other badges and relics of English life. The element o f idleness found in the English
Statute of Labourers is found in American vagrancy statutes.106 The commonality
between the two suggests an importation o f vagrancy laws from the English legal system
into the American legal system. Sherry notes, however, an essential difference in the
English Vagrancy Act of 1824 and American vagrancy law - the English Vagrancy Act of
1824 virtually limited its emphasis to conduct and did not focus on attaching criminality
to a person based solely on his or her status.

This distinction would begin to appear in

the U.S. court jurisprudence and interpretation o f the scope o f vagrancy laws in the mid
twentieth century.

Social Theories of Vagrancy Law
Vagrancy law may be considered a legal tool to aid and regulate labor supply and
enhance social control ability. There are two basic theories o f crime that David Bright
considers when he begins his analysis o f vagrancy in Calgary, Canada. The first theory
that he presents and discusses is the functionalist theory o f crime. The functionalist
theory contends that laws are not merely reflections o f the interests o f individuals and
groups that exist in a society, but transcends them and reflects the aggregate moral
consensus of society as a whole. The works o f Talcott Parsons and Emile Durkheim, and
105 Lacey, 1206.
106 Ibid., 1208.
107 Sherry, 564.

41
other sociologists, provide the foundation for this theory. The perspective o f this theory
suggests that those who performed criminal acts did so as a result o f insufficient
internalization of social norms and values. When the question o f the relevance of the
functionalist theory to social control emerges, the response is that social control is vested
into the criminal justice system to remedy poor internalization o f accepted social values
within a respective society.108
The second theory that he presents is the conflict theory of crime. The conflict
theory purports that laws and legal institutions function at the behest o f those that are
dominant in society and the principal concern is preserving the system. The framework of
this theory provides that a criminal was one who acted contrary to the interests o f the
dominant members of a respective society and was thus under subjection to that force of
its legal system. This theory gained much support and momentum from the works o f Karl
Marx. Regarding the question of social control, the conflict theory does not place primary
importance on the internalization o f values but contends that social control is vested in
the enforcers and administrators of law to accommodate the interests o f the dominant
class by suppressing those who performed the actions that are contrary to such
interests.109 The functionalist theory emphasizes the legal system as a form o f social
correction; the conflict theory emphasizes the actors performing within the system to
accommodate interests of the dominant class, highlighting the influence o f political
motivations upon criminal law implementation.

108 David Bright, “Loafers Are Not Going to Subsist Upon Public Credulence: Vagrancy and the Law in
Calgary, 1900-1914,“ Laboar/Le Travail 36 (1995): 40-1.
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Bright also presents a more refined version of the conflict model theory, which
emerges from the results of recognizing the rising bourgeoisie class in England. E.P.
Thompson, Douglas Hay, and other scholars refined the conflict model when they
observed the criminal justice procedure on the role of the bourgeoisie in the process.
Thompson and Hay identified the capacity o f the law to make a ruling class’s exercise of
power - obtained from the nature of social and economic relations - legitimate. The
refined theory suggests that the essential feature in the function of law is its capacity
rather than it a coercive design and function. Thompson and Hay reason that the law
functions adequately when both the ruled and rulers abide by it, which provides the
function of law with an essence of justice and fairness, imbuing a degree o f absolutism in
that it does not apply only to certain members of society.110
Which theory is applicable to vagrancy law during the Jim Crow Era in the United
States? While it is idealistic and typical to suggest the extended version of the conflict
theory model, history suggests that the original model is more applicable to the situation.
Further exploration of the mechanics and operative use o f vagrancy laws during the Jim
Crow era throughout the remainder o f this chapter will reveal why the Marxian conflict
theory model is most applicable.

Mississippi’s Vagrancy Laws
In 1857, Mississippi submitted to Congress its state laws. Within its statutes were
its criminal statutes, which included vagrancy, some acts that constituted public
indecency were included in the vagrancy provisions, and other acts were covered in

110 Ibid., 42.
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separate provisions. Article (Art.) 344 provides a statutory definition o f vagrancy.
Vagrants were defined as:
All able bodied persons who live without employment or labor have no visible
means of support or maintenance; Any person who shall abandon his wife or
family without just leaving them without support and in danger o f becoming a
charge; Keepers of houses o f public gaming or houses o f prostitution and
common prostitutes who have no other employment for their support or
maintenance; Any able bodied person who shall be found begging for a
livelihood; and Common gamblers or persons who for the most part maintain by
gaming.112

Table l 111
Mississippi Vagrancy Statutes
Condition/Act

Vagrancy Qualification

no visible means of employment and person is
Vagrant
seen to be able-bodied
deserted family or spouse without a means of
Vagrant
support
Running brothel or gambling house

Vagrant

able-bodied and begging

Vagrant

Person whose occupation is gambling; gambler

Vagrant

The statutory language is consistent with that o f the English vagrancy laws. A series of
conditions could subject a person to vagrancy offenses.
Art. 345 orders judges to administer vagrancy provisions and issue warrants.
When an officer brings up an offender on vagrancy charges, the judge is to examine the

111 Adapted from 64 Laws of Mississippi §69, art. 344.
112 64 Laws o f Mississippi §69, art. 344. The livelihood by gambling is also considered a vagrancy offense
under art. 338.
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facts to find evidence of vagrancy. If the offender is found guilty o f vagrancy, he is to
pay a bond $200 and behave in a manner so as to not violate the law again. If the term of
good behavior is successfully completed, the bond is returned within a year; if not
proceedings will be reinstated and the bond will be forfeited. If unable to pay, the
offender is sentenced to prison for ten days.

A second offense carries 20 days of

imprisonment without the option of a bond.114 The offender is also to be ordered by the
judge to pay court fees and imprisonment costs associated with his, or her, trial and
conviction.11:1 Considering that a majority o f the African-descended population consisted
of chattel slaves,116 this law focus more on the class stratification.
Mississippi continues to have statues for vagrancy. Its codes defined vagrants, and
tramps, under which able-bodied beggars are classified.

Offenses to the statutes are

minor; nonetheless, they still exist. Until they statutes are subject to constitutional testing
before the courts or its legislature repeals the laws, they will remain in effect.

Mississippi’s Revision of Vagrancy Laws in its Black Codes
Between the period Mississippi’s vagrancy laws passed in 1857 and the laws that
are currently effective as of 2015, Mississippi passed a special set o f vagrancy laws to
which targeted blacks. This special set of vagrancy laws were part o f Mississippi's Black

113 64 Laws o f Mississippi §69, art. 345.
114 64 Laws o f Mississippi §69, art. 347.
"■ Demoral Davis, “A Contested Presence: Free Blacks in Antebellum Mississippi, 1820-1860,”
Mississippi History Now (August 2009) http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/45/a-contestedpresence-free-blacks-in-antebellum-mississippi-18201860 (accessed December 21, 2015). Davis states,
“Blacks in Mississippi, and elsewhere in the South, became free in several ways. Prior to 1825, it was
common and legal for slaves to become free either by purchasing their freedom or by slaveholders freeing
them. Beginning in the mid-1820s, both forms of emancipation became increasingly less common and even
illegal. The primary pathways to free status for blacks were blocked... The consistently small number of
free blacks in Mississippi between 1810 and 1860 was a direct result of a network of controls, backed by
laws and race prejudice.”
116 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-29.
117 Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-37.
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Codes. These laws of the black codes were amended from the vagrancy laws o f 1857.
The laws did not solely focus on blacks, as they had included whites, but they did target
blacks.
The first section of the act expands the definition that was provided in the 1857
provision for vagrancy:
All rogues and vagabonds, idle and dissipated persons... jugglers... persons
practicing unlawful plays, runaways, common drunkards, common night-walkers,
pilferers, lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior, common
railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employment, misspend
11&
what they earn... all who neglect all lawful business...
The first section made nearly any aspect o f 4immoral' life a crime. Even what was
perceived as social disrespect toward white women was punitive under the black codes.
The second section declared all blacks, between the ages of 18 and 60, to be
vagrants if they were able-bodied and without labor or employment and unlawfully
assembled no matter the time of day; it declared whites to be vagrants if they were
engaging in social relations with blacks as equals to include sexual relations with black
women. The fines for blacks could not exceed $150 and for whites, $200; imprisonment
for blacks was not to exceed ten days and for whites, six months. The punishments
imposed were at the discretion of the court.11
The third section vested jurisdiction to hear matters concerning vagrancy to the
court officials and mayors, and it charged law enforcement with the duty o f enforcing
vagrancy laws. Should law enforcement officials choose not to enforce the vagrancy

118 “An Ex-Slave Remembers: Mississippi Black Codes,” George Mason University, adapted from from a
document placed online by Jud Sage at Northern Virginia Community College; See Laws o f the State o f
Mississippi, Passed at a Regular Session o f the Mississippi Legislature, held in Jackson, October,
November and December, 1965, Jackson, 1866, pp. 82-93, 165-167,
https://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/122/recon/code.html (accessed December 21, 2015).
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laws, they could be subject to a fine up to $100.120 The fourth section reinforced Article
344 of the Vagrancy Laws of 1857. The fifth section subjected blacks to being hired out
if they could not pay their fines by the fifth day following the imposition o f the fines.
Preference was given to the employer; blacks were hired out to the amount that was paid
off and the law permitted the employer to deduct from paid wages the amount to be paid
for imposed costs. If blacks could not be hired out, they were to be treated like
paupers.121
The sixth section permitted a tax to be levied against blacks to support a fund for
those considered to be poor blacks or mulattos. The seventh section declared that those
who failed or refused to pay as vagrants and failure or refusal to pay should function as
prima facie evidence of a vagrancy offense and subjected blacks to be hired out as stated
in the fifth section. The eighth section provided a right to appeal; fees assessed to appeal
were established not to be less than $25 or more than $150.122
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Mississippi’s Black Codes and
Marxian Conflict Theory
Mississippi’s Black Codes were
aimed at ensuring the demarcation of

the social status of blacks and whites remained. As evidenced above, restrictions were
heavily placed upon blacks to work, not be outside in any type of association that could
be identified as illegal regardless of time of day, pay taxes or be hired out, and ensure that
they could not be identified as vagrants. The statutory definition was so broad that it
would be virtually impossible not to fall into the category. Moreover, the economic
hardship that blacks faced after the Civil War was exacerbated by these cumbersome
laws, which demanded much of them economically - provide support for family, do not
engage in illegal economic or commercial activity, pay taxes to assist poor blacks and
mulattos, and if prosecuted on vagrancy charges pay or be hired out to an employer. The
social function of Mississippi’s Black Codes had not been to rehabilitate, but to exert
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control over blacks and marginal social control o f whites. Whites, so long as they did not
violate the status quo set by the laws - a reinforcement o f socioeconomic relations from
pre-Civil War Mississippi - they were not subject to the harshness of the vagrancy laws.
The body of vagrancy laws carried a brutal legal force that descended upon on blacks,
reinforced by its punitive justice system. Equality - social, political, economic - o f blacks
and whites was an interest that ran counter to that o f the dominant class and political
order.

Enforcement and Support of Vagrancy Laws
Vagrancy law, in its most principal purpose, was a body o f law that was enforced
and administered by police. Vagrancy statutes gave police a great deal of authority profiling, demand of account of oneself, swift arrest if account is not satisfactory or
adequate in officer’s judgment.

Vagrancy suspects were often to subject to summary

proceedings and judgment, meaning they were denied an indictment proceeding and a
jury proceeding. " In the U.S., vagrancy statutory classifications varied from state to
state but often included: able-bodied beggars; common thieves; fences or those that
receive an income from black market (illegal market) activity; moral dissenters (i.e.
prostitutes, gamblers, alcoholics, bootleggers); and common-law vagrants, which meant

123 See Yeamans, 788-89, 791. See also Bright, 48-9. See Lacey, 1203, 1210-11. See also Caleb Foote,
“Vagrancy Law-Type and Its Administration,” University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 104, no. 5 (1956):
614.
124 Foote, 608-9. See also Bright, 54-5. Bright shares a story of an American businessman visiting in
Canada. In the midst of back and forth traveling to his hotel room and the coffee shop where he had a cup
of coffee with his friend, he was stopped by two policemen. Despite sharing with the officers the details of
his business trip, he was arrested. He spent twenty-four hours in jail. The magistrate dismissed the vagrancy
charge, but that did not satisfy the businessman; he returned to the United States and commissioned a
lawyer to petition the Secretary of State of Ottawa to formally prosecute the officers and compensate him
for their mistreatment of him.
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those who became suspects and were stripped of the ability to provide a good account of
1

himself if found idle, begging or wandering.

c

It was very likely a person could be arrested for possibly committing a crime,
without proof or evidence, through a vagrancy charge. " When brought before the court,
the vagrancy law would operate as a last-resort prosecution, should the alleged criminal
•

•

1

7

7

prosecution be dismissed. ~ There have also been historical incidents in which having
association with a vagrant or a person suspected o f committing a vagrancy offense was
admitted as evidence, aiding in prosecution. " Often, record or testimony of past
conduct that supports the condition of vagrancy was often used as evidence in cases
against vagrancy suspects; it is worthy to note some courts deemed the evidence o f past
conduct as inadmissible. ~ The broad, sweeping statutory language virtually made many
actions an offense should the officers deem it so and the judges sustain their judgment.
Some courts supported and upheld vagrancy statutes, despite their broad
language. The New Jersey Court of Appeals maintained that:
states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in
creating and defining criminal offenses, and a statute of this character does not
violate the due process provision of the federal constitution, nor deny the violators
of the statute the equal protection of the laws, where it operates without
discrimination on all persons, and classes of persons, similarly situated; nor does
it violate the provisions of the state constitution,
1 OA

and contended that “to challenge the power of the state to prevent the commission o f such
crimes by legislation of this character, is to challenge its power to denounce and punish

125 Sherry, 558-61. Lacey, 1207.
126 See generally William O. Douglas, “Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion,” The Yale Law Journal 70, no.
1 (I960): 1-14.
127 Lacey, 1218-1219.
I2<s Ibid, 1214. Lacey asserts that there are several cases in Alabama in which a suspect could be prosecuted
of a vagrancy offense by association to one the court deems to be dissolute or of disreputable character.
129 Ibid., 1213-1214.
130 Levine v. State, 1 10 N.J.L. 467 (1933).
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the crime itself.” 131 The court defended the sovereignty o f the state rather than the rights
of the people; it had opted not to perform an analysis to see if the vagrancy statute
violated any fundamental rights.

Vagrancy is Constitutional?
Vagrancy has been supported and gone uncontested for much o f its life in the
United States. Constitutional attacks toward vagrancy laws have stated violations of
fundamental and constitutional rights as well as constitutional protections afforded to the
people by the amendments. Challenges have been on the basis of the right to travel, the
immunities and privileges' clause of the Constitution, the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
protection against self-incrimination, involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth
Amendment, excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment and necessity o f a
warrant under the Search and Seizures' clause o f the Fourth Amendment. " The U.S.
Supreme Court began establishing principle that chiseled away at the effectiveness of
vagrancy law enforcement and prosecution. In Griffin v. Illinois (1956), the Court stated:
In this tradition, our own constitutional guaranties o f due process and equal
protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious
discriminations between persons and different groups of persons. Both equal
protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system
—all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an
equality before the bar of justice in every American court'... a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.
The Court also addressed the constitutional infringement by vagrancy statutes that
restricted travel. In Edwards v. California (1941), the Court holds that restriction of travel
131 Levine, 470-71.
K’2 See generally Yeamans, 782-93.
133 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
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violates the commerce clause, an enumerated constitutional power belonging to
Congress.

In United States v. Guest (1966), the Court maintained that the right to travel

is recognized as a constitutional right.13? Therefore, wandering or roaming could no
longer be considered a crime because the person is traveling, in a sense. Not once, but
twice, the Court declared traveling to be a fundamental constitutional right; state criminal
statutes that infringed upon it were, therefore, unconstitutional. Congress was held as the
only governmental body that could address traveling via the commerce clause.
The Court held in Garrity v. New Jersey (1967) that testimonies received under
coercion are inadmissible as it infringes on testimony rights granted in the Fifth
Amendment;

The principle in the above case was extended from Miranda v. Arizona

(1966) in which the Court maintained that an interrogation without notification o f one’s
rights and the option to have an attorney present was unconstitutional.137 The rendering in
both cases struck at the policing practice o f vagrancy that asked 'idling’ suspects to give
good account.
The Court has also attacked the vagueness o f vagrancy statutes, pinpointing broad
language or the usage of very general words without providing a statutory definition.
Ambiguity in a statute renders unawareness o f an offense prior to being charged with the
offense, which means nearly any activity could be subject to criminal prosecution. The
courts have sought to remedy this by attempting to provide clarity or declaring statutes

134 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1941).
135 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-78 (1966).
136 See generally Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
1.7 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1.8 Yeamans, 791.
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unconstitutional for such ambiguity.

139

The Court found in United States v. Margeson

(1966) that proof must be provided that a person could not give good account,140 thereby
producing a restraint on the broad power that police and courts had in the prosecution of
vagrancy suspects - another strike by the Court at the exercise o f state police powers in
enforcing vagrancy laws.
Personal condition rather than conduct as an element of the criminal offense of
vagrancy was challenged and found to be unconstitutional in Fenster v. Leary (1967).141
The New York Court of Appeals declared:
This view of the matter does, of course, raise the possibility of interesting
Thirteenth Amendment problems, and plaintiff strenuously urges these as grounds
for reversal, and it also raises an interesting 'equal protection' question as to
whether persons of means are entitled any more than the poor to enjoy the
allegedly debilitating effects of idleness, but on a more fundamental level, we feel
the statute is defective on the ground that, whatever purpose and role it may or
may not have served in an earlier day, and however valid or invalid may be the
proposition that the able-bodied unemployed poor are a likely source o f crime...
If it is only to allow arrests and criminal prosecutions for vagrancy to continue
against individuals such as these that the Attorney-General would have us uphold
the statute, then it must fall. And despite certain fairly recent cases upholding
similar statutes, we can, in fact, see no other purpose in our statute today and,
therefore, find it invalid.142
The court based its decision its view of the operation o f the vagrancy statute. It found that
the purpose of the operation was outmoded and no longer justified in practice and thus,
declared the statute invalid. It considered that the statute might infringe upon protections
afforded to citizens by the Thirteenth Amendment by seeking to coerce them to seek
work. Furthermore, the court considered the ambiguity in defining the offense, which
subjects the offender to disparate treatment under the color o f the law.

144 Ibid., 790-91.
140 United States v. Margeson, 259 F.Supp. 256, 270-71 (1966).
141 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309 (1967)
142 Ibid., 315-17.
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In Papachristou v. City o f Jacksonville (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court rendered
the city's vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional. It reasoned that the classifications within
the ordinance were outmoded, making acts that were contemporarily seen as “normally
innocent” criminal. It also contended the ambiguity of the ordinance made it void.14’ The
declaration functioned to limit police power that the Court viewed as unrestrained and
implicitly, abused. The rule of invalidating a law for vagueness was followed again in

City o f Chicago v. Morales (1999);144 however, the plurality opinion suggests laxation
from the Court on other principles, which it was once stringent upon.

Mississippi’s Black Codes and the Thirteenth Amendment
The Black Codes of Mississippi operated outside o f the scope o f the Thirteenth
Amendment. It was enacted before the Amendment was passed. The Union did not
readmit Mississippi until 1870, and it was readmitted although it had not ratified the
Thirteenth Amendment prior to readmission. The state had not considered itself violating
the laws of a nation to which it did not belong. Afterward, the state continued to disregard
the law to some degree as it had not ratified the Amendment until 1995; moreover, the
exception clause was the prefect tool for manipulation. By declaring nearly everything a
crime, the state could subject who it desired to slavery and involuntary servitude, once
the criminal was ‘duly’ convicted.
Therefore, the vagrancy laws of the Mississippi's Black Codes did not operate to
violate the Thirteenth Amendment as it had been abolished prior to the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment, but the laws lived on through other means. Vagrancy laws, for a
l4j See generally Papachristou.
144 Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
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long time, managed to utilize the punishment exception clause to undermine the entire
Amendment. It was not until the 1930s that Supreme Court began its torrent of
constitutional attacks on methods used to enforce vagrancy laws. Such attacks on what
could be done under state police powers affected enforcement; however, Papachristou
administered quite the strike to the effect of vagrancy laws, by effectively limiting the
broad range of offenses covered under vagrancy statutes.
Vagrancy laws operated from the gray area overlap of police powers that faced
restriction in beginning in the mid-twentieth century. It traveled from England and
became customarily accepted. Although the statutory definitions presented many
complications and challenges to the protection of constitutional rights, they survived
fairly intact until the mid-twentieth century. Vagrancy was rampant and widespread in
times of economic transition and new labor system incipience to ensure an adequate
supply of labor.
The function of vagrancy laws o f the Mississippi Black Codes fared no different;
it ensured the labor supply for the economic transition o f the state from slave labor to free
labor. Amidst the transition, the laws descended upon the blacks, natives and migrants to
the state, with blunt forces. The laws were not only designed to provide a pool of
available labor, but to maintain the socioeconomic hierarchy that had existed before the
Civil War disrupted life, not only in Mississippi but the South. When restrictions began to
flood in from court rulings, Mississippi, like other states, had to find ways to create
vagrancy laws that did not infringe on the constitutional rights of its citizen, and it did.
Today, laws still exist in Mississippi’s Code that defined and punish those committing
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acts of vagrancy. It appears that the Thirteenth Amendment was ineffective then and
remains so now.

Chapter 3: Peonage
In June 1924, two black men named George Diamond and Galvester Jackson
began working for M.B. Davis (alias Mood Davis) at Camp Sanders in Florida.
Approximately two weeks after they began their employment, Diamond and Jackson left,
with permission, with a promise to retrieve Diamond’s family from River Junction to
bring them to Camp Sanders. Camp Sanders was one o f two farms operated by D avis.l4>
The other turpentine farm146 was called Farmdale. Camp Sanders was ten miles west of a
town named Wewahitchka and Farmdale was twenty-five miles southwest of the tow n.147
To paint a visual picture of Wewahitcka, consider the following details. Wewahitchka is
a town located in the panhandle of Florida, not very far from Panama City. It is known
for its two unique features: twin lakes, almost identical in size - the Dead Lakes and
Tupelo Honey. The name comes from the Seminole language and means “two eyes.”

148

It is about 174 miles from Mobile, AL (212 miles in driving distance).

145 Daniel, 140.
146 It should be noted that turpentine is a hazardous substance. See U.S., Department of Health and Human
Services, Center for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, “International
Chemical Safety Cards,” http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ipcsneng/nengl063.html (accessed November 18,
2015). It states different symptoms that may occurs as a result of contact with turpentine, to include skin
irritation (redness and pain), respiratory irritation (coughing, shortened breathing, sore throat), and eye
irritation (redness, pain and blurred vision). See also U.S., Department of Health and Human Services and
U.S. Department of Labor, “Occupational Health Guideline for Turpentine,” (September 1978), 1. It
expands on some of the information in the safety cards, stating that “greater exposure may result in
“unconsciousness or death.”
147 Davis v. United States 12 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1926).
148 City of Wewahitchka: Home of Dead Lakes and Tulepo Honey, “Home,”
http://www.cityofwewahitchka.com/ (accessed February 24, 2016). According to the website, “The city's
Seminole Indian name means "water eyes", and a view from the sky above reveals why —two almost
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The hunt began for the human capital that took leave and failed to return. On
August 8, Diamond and Jackson, who had not yet returned to Camp Sanders, were
arrested on charges of larceny of Davis’s property valued at $8.50, at the behest o f Davis
and taken to the county jail in Blountstown, Calhoun County. When Diamond and
Jackson appeared before the court to plead their case, Davis was present. He made a
statement insinuating that the defendants should plead guilty, for if they did not, they
would be sentenced to eight months in prison. The defendants plead guilty.150
Simultaneously, the court was also hearing a case against Henry Sanders, who was
alleged to have committed larceny o f the property o f Charles Land’s brother, valued at
$2.75; he also plead guilty. The judge ordered each o f the defendants to be released on
payment of costs. Davis paid the costs against each defendant - $37.28 total against
Diamond and Jackson and $25 against Sanders - and also assumed responsibility for a
debt claimed against Sanders by Land’s brother amounting to $100. Having paid the
costs, the defendants were released and Davis took them to Farmdale. There, Diamond,
Jackson and Sanders were held upon their agreement to work o f their debts, incurred
when he paid their costs and debts as well as the additional indebtedness he initially
claimed against Diamond and Jackson. Another laborer, by the name o f Dewitt Stonan,
was also being held for a debt.151
Up until the night of September 29, the four peons had remained under
surveillance and kept in compulsory service because they feared physical punishment and
perfectly round lakes nestled into the heart of this community add to the community's relaxed charm, and
make a special backdrop to the city's downtown Lake Alice Park.”
149 Distance Between Cities, “Distance from Mobile, AL to Wewahitchka,” http://www.distancecities.com/distance-mobile-al-to-wewahitchka-fl (accessed February 24, 2016).
150 Davis, 254-55.
151 Ibid., 255. Judge Bryan’s opinion suggest that there is no evidence reflecting that Stone had been
criminally charged.
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further criminal prosecution; however, this would be the night o f they intended to escape
the clutches of peonage at the Farmdale turpentine farm. The wives o f both Sanders and
Stonan accompanied the four peons in making their escape, secretly leaving the farm in
the darkness of night. The following morning, they went to the home o f a woman named
May Bell McGee in a town near Wewahitchka, where they left the women and continued
on. They traveled around the town and stayed in the woods near West Arm highway
bridge until night, when they planned to cross the bridge as night would decrease their
chances of being caught and apprehended.

IS?

That same morning, Davis and his employees, Carey Whitfield, Frank Daniels,
and Will Proctor, went to the town to search for the escaped peons. Davis, accompanied
by another man, went to the home of Sander's father-in-law, Matthew Brown. Assured
that Sanders was not there, Davis continued the hunt and headed up the road toward
Blountstown. Following Davis’s departure, Brown went into his vehicle and began
searching for his daughter; he found her and Stonan's wife at McGhee’s house. He
intended to bring them to his home. He began this operation, but it was not completed.
They encountered Davis and his employees who overtook them and captured the women,
taking them back to Wewahitchka. There, Proctor took charge and kept watch over the
captured women.1?3
After the ordeal, Davis consulted with Land, Whitfield and Daniels. Following the
consultation, he departed with Land in Land's vehicle. That night, Whitfield and Daniels
found and captured the escaped peons at the north end of the bridge. In less than half an
hour, Davis and Land arrived to the scene in Land's vehicle; Davis and the other
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
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defendants (Whitfield, Daniels, Proctor and Land), each one armed, collected Stonan,
Diamond, Jackson and Sanders, had Stonan whip the others, and then put them in the
vehicle and brought them back to Wewahitchka. Once there, the peons and the wives of
the two already in Proctor’s charge were split up; Diamond was given to Land and the
remaining peons and the two wives were returned to Farmdale.l?4
Within the following days, a series o f events ensued, which led to the conviction
of Davis, Land, Whitfield, Daniels and Proctor. Davis queried deputy marshal H. H.
Bowles to learn what constituted peonage. Such a question led to Bowles’s permission to
testify in court over objection. The case was heard in the District Court o f the United
States for the Northern District of Florida by Judge William B. Sheppard. The jury
considered the following indictments: (1) “'holding Henry Sanders to a condition of
peonage,” l5? which consisted of a single count; (2) "holding George Diamond, Galvester
Jackson and Dewitt, [sic] Stonan in a condition of peonage,” 1?6 which consisted of four
counts; (3) the arrest of and return to, “separately and severally, Diamond, Jackson,
Sanders and Stonan, respectively, to a condition of peonage, in order to compel to work
for Davis in payments of debt which they owed him,” l:>7 which consisted o f eight counts,
four for the arrest and four for the return; and (4) “aiding and abetting.”

Davis was

convicted on all the counts of the first, second and third indictments. He was sentenced to
pay a fine of $500 and thirteen months of imprisonment. Land was convicted on the
counts of arrest on the third indictment and sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and one year
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and one day of imprisonment. Whitfield, Daniels and Proctor were also convicted on
several counts of the third indictment. The case was appealed, but certiorari was
denied.159
This is just one type of scenario o f debtors came to know the involuntary
servitude system known as peonage. It was also another case in a string o f peonage cases
that began in 1902. Peonage, one of the many forms of involuntary servitude that
occurred in the post-slavery era, is a topic that is under-discussed in the American
historical narrative. While its roots are in Latin America, it took on a monstrous
development of its own in the U .S.160 It appeared as an economic tool and relegation of
blacks and immigrants to a second-class status.161
Peonage, defined most simply, is coerced servitude based on debt; the peon is the
individual held in compulsory service against his or her will until the obligation o f debt is
fulfilled.

Peonage, along with other systems created from local and state laws, were

intrinsically forms of involuntary servitude. Peonage could develop within the context of
private contractual relations or as the aftermath o f a conviction by which the convicted

160 See e.g. Arnold J. Bauer, ‘"Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression,”
The Hispanic American Historical Review 59, no. 1 (1979): 34-63; Harry E. Cross, “Debt Peonage
reconsidered: A Case in study in Nineteenth-Century Zacatecas, Mexico,” Business History Review’ (1979):
472-95; Donna J. Guy, “Women, Peonage, and Industrialization: Argentina, 1810-1914,” Latin American
Research Review’ 16, no. 3 (1981): 65-89; Alan Knight, “Mexican Peonage: What Was It and Why Was
It?,” Journal o f Latin American Studies 18, no. 1 (1986): 41-74; and Brian Loveman, “Critique of Arnold J.
Bauer’s ‘Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression’,” The Hispanic
American Historical Review 59, no. 3 (1979): 478-85. See also William Hirt Howe, “The Peonage Cases,”
Columbia Law Review 4, no. 4 (1904): 279. See also “Violations of Federal Peonage Laws by State
Statutes,” Virginia Law Review 2, no. 5 (1915): 386.
161 See generally Daniel, The Shadow o f Slavery, also, see generally Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name.
162 N. Gordon Carper, “Slavery Revisited: Peonage in the South,” Phylon 37, no. 1 (1976), 85. N. Gordon
Carper suggests that peonage is involuntary servitude based on debt or “alleged debt or indebtedness.” He
states, "The origins of peonage are as varied as they are complex. Through law, custom and racism as well
as the political, economic and social chaos resulting from the Civil War-Reconstruction era, men were
shackled physically and spiritually and compelled to labor for those who constituted the ‘Establishment’.”
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would be handed over to the care of a surety or leased to a private company; the latter
1z ^

became known as convict-leasing.
Peonage, although abolished by law, existed well into the twentieth century
because state and local governments enacted laws and permitted situations that carried
the vestiges and badges of slavery or created a condition o f peonage. The “peon” would
not be identified as a slave. Nonetheless, he or she would be placed in situations,
supported by law and enforced by the courts and law enforcement, that created peonage,
thus utilizing the punishment exception clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to create
laws that restricted freedom to move from employer to employer and made breach o f
contract and fraud statutory criminal offenses. It appears that there was a power struggle
between state governments of the South and the federal government in governing the
jurisdictions where the Thirteenth Amendment, or the statutes that were built from it,
were not being followed.

American Peonage, An Overview
In an article examining the historical context of peonage in post-Civil War and
Jim Crow Florida, N. Gordon Carper describes peonage - how it came to exist and how it
was an interlocking form of involuntary servitude that provided for and received from
other forms of involuntary servitude: vagrancy, convict-leasing and the criminal-surety
l6'’ See generally Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name. Blackmon implies this connection his explanation
of how people would enter the convict-leasing system, often under contractual obligation: the courts would
contract with private parties to lease out convicts. Those who bid highest or took full advantage of this
contractual opportunity tended to be industrial actors and officials of the government. See also 42 U.S.C.A.
§1994. Within the language of the first section of the statute provides a legal definition: “the voluntary or
involuntary service or labor o f any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or
otherwise,” which most simply declares peonage as voluntary and involuntary servitude to pay off a debt.
See also Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. “peonage.” Here, peonage is defined as a “condition of
servitude (prohibited by 13th Amendment) compelling persons to perform labor in order to pay off a debt.”
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system.

164

One who owes a debt by way o f contractual agreement can be subject to

involuntary servitude because of what he owes. He reasons that some people did not owe
a debt but would find themselves caught up in the peonage system. The social attitudes at
the turn of the century were residual from the Civil War-Reconstruction Era.
Three patterns of peonage, according to Daniel, stretched across the South - the
cotton belt, the turpentine areas and railroad construction camps. The cotton belt
consisted of land stretching from the Carolinas to Texas and included the Mississippi
Delta. The turpentine camps and naval stores were abundant in northern Florida, southern
Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. The railroad construction camps ran along three lines
that intersected in Mississippi: the first extended from Mississippi to Florida, cutting
through the turpentine belt; the second ran northward from the lower Mississippi River
through Mississippi, Louisiana and Arkansas; and the intersecting line between the two,
which accounts for the third line, ran from Mississippi through the cotton belt to South
Carolina.165
The state and local laws were shaped by the attitudes and thus influenced the
dynamic of the labor force procured by peonage. Carper’s statement identifies and
proffers that the elements and tools that created and perpetuated peonage can be found in
a plethora of contexts and influences that affected the United States during the period
extending from the Civil War to post-Jim Crow. The justice system, legal system and law
enforcement institutions operated as tools that perpetuated involuntary systems and

164 Carper, 85.
165 Daniel, 21-2.
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conditions that were in keeping with the ‘badges and incidents’166 of slavery. His
statement also highlights the struggle historians, and scholars to some extent, have had
with developing an expansive definition - the variety of origins o f peonage. Historians
and scholars often look to the origins to establish a clear starting point and identify
patterns and changes to create a trajectory of origin to a contemporary understanding of
their topic.

The Peonage Cases (1903) was a response issued to a grand jury who had
question regarding peonage and involuntary servitude. The questions asked were material
to three peonage cases that were before the federal courts: United States v. Lewis, United

States v. Lewis and United States v. Clyatt.167 The jury was curious as to what elements
constitute peonage and what constitutes involuntary servitude. Judge Jones, who
delivered the response, declares, “Peonage was not slavery, as it formerly existed in this
country. The peon was not a slave. He was a freeman, with political as well as civil

166 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 4, 19 (1905). Justice Brewer presents an example of the badges and
vestiges of slavery in the following statement: “But that it was not the intent of the Amendment to
denounce every act done to an individual which was wrong if done to a free man and yet justified in a
condition of slavery, and to give authority to Congress to enforce such denunciation, consider the
legislation in respect to the Chinese. In slave times in the slave States not infrequently every free Negro
was required to carry with him a copy of a judicial decree or other evidence of his right to freedom or be
subject to arrest. That was one of the incidents or badges of slavery.” Carrying around freedom papers as a
prescribed action is a vestige/badge/relic/incident of slavery, as Justice Brewer sees it. See also Ibid., 32-3.
Justice Harlan states, “But I stood with the court in the declaration that the Thirteenth Amendment not only
established and decreed universal civil and political freedom throughout this land, but abolished the
incidents or badges of slavery, among which, as the court declared, was the disability, based merely on race
discrimination, to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, and to be a witness against
a white person.” In this statement, he identifies rights that follow after the elimination of badges and
vestiges of slavery. The rights that he mentions are those which were not permitted to slaves; thus, granting
such rights to those who were once slave and became freedmen was to dismantle and eliminate some
badges and vestiges of slavery.
167 W. Howe, 281.
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rights. He entered into the relation from choice, for a definite period, as the result of
mutual contract. The relation was not confined to any race.” 168
In this statement. Judge Jones begins to draw the distinctions between peonage
and slavery. In slavery, members of the Negro race were enslaved, children that were
born to an enslaved mother and the condition of enslavement was lifelong. Enslaved
Africans had no political or civil rights. They could not sue in court, enter into contracts
or testify before a judge.169 While there are some badges o f slavery that seeped into the
system of peonage, the two were not one and the same. It was necessary for him to do to
clear misunderstandings and misconceptions. He continues to distinguish between the
two, stating that the condition of peonage was not passed from parent to child and the
service of the child could not be contracted away by his or her parent, with the exception
or rare cases, and the terms of service was negotiable between the peon [laborer] and
master [employer].

Judge Jones explains the voluntary and original nature o f peonage,

which clearly distinguishes it from chattel slavery, his initial reference for comparison.
After this explanation. Judge Jones concludes that this system o f voluntary
servitude was perverted by those who administered the law .171 The legal rights o f peons
were not carefully guarded against the wills and desires of their employers. On the

l<>x The Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671,673 (District M.D. Ala. 1903).
I(’g Trotter Jr., 64; White, Bay, and Martin, 59. The two aforementioned sources discuss colonial laws that
subjugated blacks to the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, stripping them of political and civil rights as
well as humanity. Some of the laws were enacted as early as 1661. Colonial Virginia enacted a law that
made declared all blacks to be slaves and their condition of slavery was to be “durante vida,” for the
duration of life, in simpler words, lifelong. See also Trotter, 77. He discusses the adoption of Slave Codes
in Colonial America, which systematically deprived blacks of their civil and human rights and identified
them as property.
170 The Peonage Cases, 673-74.
171 Ibid.. 674.
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contrary, Judge Jones finds that they were “unscrupulously disregarded.”

Such

administration was akin to another involuntary servitude system - vagrancy, discussed at
length in the previous chapter. Judge Jones finds that it “resulted in citizens becoming
bound, in constantly increasing numbers and length of service, to compulsory ‘service or
labor’ to coerce payment of debt or compel the performance of real or pretended
obligations of personal service.” 17j In the losing battle, the peon found himself, or
herself,174 performing involuntary servitude. Thus, the procedural mishandling o f the
peons’ rights perverted the system, from voluntary, into one o f involuntary servitude.
Peonage was a peculiar system o f labor. It was a system in which a person that
was indebted to another would agree to work out the debt through a means o f labor and
coerced to remain in service until the debt was repaid. A person could enter debt through
various means - an advance on transportation costs to work site, a debt incurred by one
employer paying of the debt of a laborer to another employer, becoming part o f the
convict-leasing system, owing employers for providing basic human needs (clothing,
shelter and food), etc. Once indebted, the term o f service could be extended because the
value of labor was often determined, or interpreted, by the employer. Not every person
that entered into peonage endured lifelong servitude, some found relief through court
remedy - rescission of the contract, release from contractual obligation, or release by
nullification of the law that incriminates breach o f contract.

172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Peonage was not a system of gender discrimination; both men and women worked on peonage farms.
Women could perform services connected with domestic care, home economics and textile labor, or they
could be subject to perform sexual services. A case discussed later in the paper is about a woman who runs
a brothel and subjects her female laborers to compulsory sexual service.
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In the following narrative, which, according to Freedom on My Mind: A History

o f African Americans, With Documents, first appeared in the Independent in 1904, there
is a reflection on the state of peonage in the U.S. at the turn of the twentieth century. A
black peon shares his account and experience o f peonage. He begins his account with a
bit of information about him. He was born in Elbert County, Georgia during the war, but
reveals that he is unclear of his age. He immediately begins discussing his experience of
peonage. When the time came to settle accounts and discuss account balances, he learned
that none of his debt nor that of other peons, which had accumulated over the course o f a
few years, had been settled; rather the debts accumulated to $100 or more. He owed the
Senator, his obligor, $165.
He maintains that this information was according to the bookkeeper, implicitly
disagreeing with the records. He expresses a sentiment that was a badge o f slavery refuting a white man. The apprehension that comes from refuting a white man had
consequences as it was a disruption to the social order during slavery. He and the others
were told that they may be released if they sign their acknowledgements; his desire to be
released from the Senator's employ drove him to sign a document. The narrative reflects
that he nor the other read it; instead, they signed it and went on their way, believing they
were released. Shortly after they left, they were pursued and retrieved by a search party,
which consisted of a constable and a number o f men. They were confined in the Senator’s
stockade and informed the next morning by the guards that papers they signed were not
only an acknowledgement of their debt but also an agreement to continue their
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employment under the Senator until the debts were liquidated.17? The account given
above is representative of the fact that a majority of blacks were uneducated. The lack of
education is often to blame for them signing contracts, for they just had confidence in the
“master’s” words.
As he explains above, they were willing to do anything, and he does not express
that they read. Moreover, he says that the following morning the meaning o f the
acknowledgement was explained to them, instead of being free, they had signed on for a
longer period of servitude. He also explains that the debt amounts did not change, or
appear to change, at least. The account expressed above is an example o f the system-wide
effect of peonage. At no point did the justice system see an unfair bargaining advantage
in the master-peon relationship or deception, misrepresentation or fraud on the part o f the
master. It is clear that the peon had not been aware o f what he signed. According to the
account of the black peon, he was: (1) informed that he might be released from his
contractual obligation, should he sign the document, which had been revealed afterwward
to be an acknowledgement of debt and an agreement to extend the term of contracted
service; and (2) after signing and leaving that night, he was pursued, apprehended and
imprisoned.
Apprehension and imprisonment of a peon is prohibited by the PAA. There is no
clear misrepresentation for telling him that he might be released and then placed in
servitude that would be deemed violative of the PAA. It is clear that he had signed (not
necessarily agreed to) an unconscionable contract, which should have been deemed void
by the court. In the final sentence o f the above quote rests a striking statement. The peon
175 '‘A Negro Peon: The New Slavery in the South, 1904,” Independent (1904) provided in White, Bay and
Martin, 476.
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declares that he and the other peons were treated like convicts. He makes no distinction
between the slavery and peonage when regarding the conditions. While he can identify
the legal term peon, he finds the condition of being a peon and being a slave to be the
same thing. He suggests that no matter which name the “hell on earth” he was
experiencing had been all the same to him .176 Thus, the badges of slavery, expressed in
his narrative, existed, although the Thirteenth Amendment and additional legislation were
aimed at ending them. At the foundation lies the contradiction found such laws and a
political figure, the Senator, who had violated them.

Convict-Leasing, Legal Peonage
Convict-leasing existed as a legal form of peonage. It was administered by a
justice of the peace. It served two purposes: 1) to accrue funds that were so desperately
needed by local and county governments and provide cheap, or virtually free, labor to
planters and corporations; and 2) terrorization o f blacks to comply with white
supremacy.

Those who opposed so-called bargains or contracts were exposed to mob

threats and terrorism.

It was the misfortune of blacks that they would experience the

horrors of such a system.
Carper suggests that there was a causal relationship between the convict leasing
system and peonage and that the convict leasing system, in effect, provided labor the
system of peonage. He finds vagrancy to be the origin of the labor pool.179 Vagrancy,
discussed in the previous chapter, was a crime o f personal condition. One could be

Blackmon, 68-9.
178 Ibid., 121.
179 Carper, 86.
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arrested for idleness; if he could not furnish documentation as proof o f gainful
employment or provide a “good account,” he received a summary judgment and was
imprisoned. Afterward, he would be leased out to the highest bidder. Following that, he
would enter into peonage. If the service is extended beyond the term of the sentence, the
condition of peonage is met.

Since the process began with incrimination, he would be

deprived of certain liberties normally reserved to free persons.
Carper interpreted from a statement made by the Assistant Attorney General of
the United States, Charles W. Russell, in 1906, that a positive relationship existed in the
convict-leasing system and peonage. According to Russell, once a person was tried and
convicted, he would be “held in involuntary servitude by the man who has leased him.” 181
The lessee would pay nothing for the leased person’s labor and the state would receive no
money for the period in which the convict is “detained.” 182
“Everybody knows that the great bulk o f convict is Negroes. Everybody knows
the character of a Negro and knows that there is no punishment in the world that can take
the place of the lash with him. He must be controlled that way.” This was the statement
of a Sumter County, Alabama representative at the Alabama constitutional convention.
The statement reveals so much - a resistant ideology to any type o f equality with blacks,
justification for abuse towards blacks and a desire to wield and maintain control over the
population once subject to political, social, economic and spiritual inferiority, protected
by laws.183

180 Carper, 86.
181 U.S. Department of Justice, Report on Peonage, by Charles Russell, Assistant Attorney General
(Washington, D.C., 1908), 17, quoted in Carper, “Slavery Revisited,’' 86.
Ibid.
183
Ibid., 122.

69
On September 10, 1901, John Davis, a black man, set off to go to see his wife,
Nora, who was in declining health. The season demanded working the farm from dusk to
dawn; it was impossible to take care o f Nora and their two children, so he sent them off
to her mother’s home to be cared for while he remained home to take care of their farm.
Although he was home and toiled to bring in their cotton crops, he made the decision to
see Nora as she continued to live in her ailing condition. He feared her death was
impending, though he prayed it would not come, especially before he could see her.
Davis traveled down the railway of the Center o f Georgia rail line to a bend in the
outskirts of Goodwater where he, and other blacks, knew the train would have to slow
down; when it did, they aware o f the possibility o f jumping onto the empty cars and
travel to various cities to include Goodwater, Alabama. Davis’s destination, and
Birmingham.
Davis departed the train in Goodwater and continue his journey, pedestrianly
during the dusk hours of the day. As he reached some homes a short distance away from
the Goodwater train station, an officer o f the law, Robert N. Franklin, called to him
asking if he had any money. Franklin was an appointed constable o f the town as well as a
local businessman who ran a dry goods store. His question was a method of determining
whether one was a vagrant. Davis responded that he had no money then quickly adjusted
his answer to reflect that he had money, but none to spare. Franklin inquired when he was
going to pay the money he was owed. Davis rebutted that he owed Franklin nothing.

184

Ibid., 117-22.
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Franklin walked off; however, Davis knew that it was not the last he would see of
Franklin. I8~
Davis arrived at the home of Nora’s parents. A few hours after being united with
his family, Franklin appeared at the house. This time, Franklin came demanding the
money, telling Davis to pay him or he will be arrested; Davis refused his ultimatum,
maintaining that he owed him nothing. Franklin left and returned with another constable,
Francis M. Pruitt, who came claiming he had a warrant for Davis, which was never
served upon him.

Hours later, Davis had been locked in calaboose with four other

blacks, who had been detained within the past forty-eight hours. Jesse London, the justice
of peace, swiftly administered the case. The warrant identified Pruitt rather than Franklin
as the victim of wrongful appropriation and Davis plead guilty. How or why is unknown.
Nonetheless, he was ordered to pay a fine and court costs; the amount went unrecorded.
Unable to pay, Davis was brought to John Pace's farm and forced into a contract with
Pace - his entry into peonage.

187

Davis's experience is an example o f how one entered into legal peonage. The
details of his cases were lost in memories as records of such proceedings were scant.
Those accounts iterated in later indictments captured inconsistent details.

It was under

the name of crime and punishment that he entered a system o f involuntary servitude,
clout with conditions akin to, and sometimes, worse than slavery.
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Conditions of Peonage
The conditions presented in the scenarios above are not fabricated illusions, but
real conditions that laborers endured. The peon served until his time was complete (the
expiration of term sometimes being his or her own expiration of life). The peon in the
narrative provided in the section of this thesis titled, "‘American Peonage, An Overview'’
explained the conditions on the peonage farm. Some o f the descriptions included filthy
sleeping quarters, deaths of peons, at least two (he recalled) to have been killed by the
guards for committing minor offenses, severe and brutal whippings, workdays were from
dusk to dawn regardless of weather conditions and timed and rationed meals.

The

conditions of the peon farm where he labored possessed the badges o f slavery. What does
not appear in his account in any remedy or litigation o f his case and situation; instead, he
served his whole time there. The accounts of the medical examiners and prison
inspectors, discussed by Douglas, reiterate these conditions. The connection between the
conditions of peonage and convict-leasing imply that were shared rather than distinct and
very much reminiscent of slavery.

The State’s Role in Peonage
Such accounts were not uncommon. A major source that permitted, and in some
cases, allowed for maintenance of the system o f peonage was the black codes' sections of
various state laws. It was one of several tools used to create and perpetuate forms of
involuntary servitude. The legislative actions o f the Black Codes were retaliation against
the victors of the Civil War to legalize a form of slavery and oppression amongst blacks,
189 “A Negro Peon,” 476-77. The reports of prison inspectors reflect similar conditions in the prison mines
to which convict laborers were leased. See footnotes 72 and 75 for more details.
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thus exercising their police powers. It would not be until 1901, that such police powers
would begin to be eclipsed and preempted by federal powers, modestly.
As Pamela Brandwein has noted, “Some referred simultaneously to the end of
slavery and the continuation of it, despite its formal prohibition.” 190 Brandwein captures
the perception of some that the powers o f the Thirteenth Amendment would be limited; it
was construed to not have done enough to combat all forms o f slavery or involuntary
servitude. The statement also addresses that some forms and systems of involuntary
servitude - vagrancy, peonage and convict-leasing - persisted and states passed a set of
laws that aided, if not supported these systems.
Alluding generally to the Black Codes, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts
stated, "In several of these States new laws are being framed containing provisions
wholly inconsistent with the freedom of the freedmen."191 Senator Wilson had identified
the purpose and target of the Black Codes, which was to distinguish the black population
that was in its jurisdiction and curtail their constitutional rights. The stringent set of laws
was designed to restrict those freedoms granted by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Although the Thirteenth Amendment legally prohibited slavery and
involuntary servitude, the Black Codes provided the South with legalized involuntary
servitude by criminalizing breach o f contract, restricting a laborer's right to choose
amongst competing employers and failure to pay a debt.
Peonage and contract-based disputes that ended up in court had criminal penalties,
although they are civil in nature. According to Judge Jones (1903), “On these lines

190 Pamela Brandwein, “Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congresses,” Law c£ Society
Review 34, no. 2 (2000): 335.
191 Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session 39 (1865), quoted in Brandwein (2000): 335.
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legislation cannot move at all, when the act complained o f is not a crime, but the mere
breach of the obligations of a contract... in all free governments the good sense of
mankind, since the days when imprisonment for debt was abolished, has condemned and
frowned down any attempt to coerce the performance o f civil obligations by criminal
penalties.” “ Such reasoning led the Court to declare invalid the Alabama statute that
made breach of contract a crime. The construction o f the Thirteenth Amendment did not
wholly confront predisposition of unconscionable laws against blacks, thus allowing for
the legislation of the Black Codes.
As noted already, the Black Codes functioned as a legal apparatus for continuing
the condition of involuntary servitude for blacks. The ideology o f the Supreme Court
justices also played a significant role in ensuring this. Thomas Davis asserts that
considerations of social and racial inequality and subjugation influenced the justices to
declare the Civil Rights Acts of 1875 unconstitutional. The consensus o f the decision, 81, reflects the ideology regarding the protection o f citizens irrespective to race and class.
The majority opinion reflects that such an enactment (the Civil Rights Act o f 1875) is not
within congressional expression power o f the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

1QT

Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment began to lose effectiveness. A striking feature o f the
decision is the Court's interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, which limited the
Amendment’s ability to reach private actors. If it could not be applied to social

192 The Peonage Cases, 690-91.
I9' Thomas J. Davis, Race Relations in America: A Reference Guide with Primary Documents, (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 2006), 109. See also Brandwein, 326. Brandwein discusses how the slave society
operated - meaning that blacks were to be denied personal and civil rights; much of that was reflected in
the conservative political ideology. She further argues that the Moderate Republicans in the 39th Congress
had even found that such social views and behaviors conflicted with republican government.
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situations,194 it also could not affect economic situations as well, which was what initially
occurred with peonage.
The justice who delivered the majority opinion, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, stated
that Congress could not declared such an enactment through authorization of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to stipulate what may be called “social rights of
men and races.” 193 He further went on to exclaim that social discrimination was not
aligned and did not signify any type of “slavery or servitude,” and to allow it to apply
“every act of discrimination” to slavery arguments would make it redundant.196
Nonetheless, the attitudes and policies o f private whites were based on badges and
incidents of slavery. Furthermore, scholars o f the Thirteenth Amendment argue that the
amendment applies to both private and state actors.

However, in the historical

perspective, the consensus shaped the jurisprudence based on the surrounding political,
social and economic environments - each expressing racial discrimination to some
degree. Thus, the argument of the Thirteenth Amendment reaching private actors was not
one considered by the majority opinion.
The influences and implications o f this judicial opinion can be found in the legal
systems of involuntary servitude, which appeared in a variety o f ways, to include

194 Social situations refer to how blacks treated whites and how whites treated blacks. Blacks could be
mistreated by whites and social situations and still needed to maintain a level of respect towards whites, or
else they could risk injury or death. Congress even recognized a need to pass the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) Act
of 1871 because it was aware of the KICK acting to demean, demoralize and kill black people.
195 Davis, Race Relations in America, 109.
196 Ibid. It should be noted that social discrimination of this sort, racial social discrimination, was a badge
and relic of slavery. Since Bacon’s Rebellion and the passing of the law that provided slavery a racial
foundation, which targeted Africans and those of African descent only, it was embedded into social
interactions between whites and blacks.
197 George Rutherglen. “State Action, Private Action and the Thirteenth Amendment,” Virginia Law
Review 94 (2008): 1367. See also “Violation of Federal Peonage Statutes by State Statutes,” Virginia Law
Review 2, no. 5 (1915): 385-6; and Baher Azmy, “Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendments: Modern
Slavery and a Civil Rights Agenda,” Fordham Law Review 1A (2002): 1043.
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peonage. Its suggestion that social discrimination did not violate the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments enabled Southern local and state legislatures to design legal
mechanisms that used the suggestion as a foundation for the discrimination to follow vagrancy, peonage, convict-leasing, criminal-surety, etc. Officers o f the law worked
cooperatively with private white citizens to ensure that blacks wound up in a condition of
compulsory service.
Carper, among other historians and scholars, have found the Black Codes o f
southern states hosted a set of laws that were purposed on controlling the black
population.

1QR

Considering the historical context - racism, badges and incidents o f

slavery, superior attitudes of Southern whites, desire to keep the social and economic
systems that they have developed in place, refusal to be told to do otherwise by the
federal government - bring about an understanding o f how to identify exactly who the
legislatures intended to target. Embedded within the black codes o f various Southern
states was a set of laws that made breach o f contract and fraud, or intent to, a criminal
act. 199
Southern state legislatures passed statutes that were designed to keep the
undesired population in a system similar to that of chattel slavery, to reinforce their
socioeconomic hierarchy and to keep in place their traditions o f superiority and respected
(warranted or unwarranted).200 They reasoned that laws that called for compulsory action
sanctioned by the courts to have the person who breached the contract detained and made
criminal and replaces remedy for civil liability creates and satisfies, or at a minimum,
198 Other historians and scholars include Joe William Trotter Jr., Deborah Gray White, Mia Bay, Waldo E.
Martin Jr., Douglas Blackmon, Pete Daniel, and Glen Rutherglen.
199 “Constitutional Law: Imprisonment for Debt: Peonage,” Michigan Law Review 6, no. 6 (1908): 504.
200 Trotter, 297.
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sanctions a condition of peonage and held that it was invalid.

201

Thus, the courts had

interpreted the congressional power used to protect civil rights as having prohibited such
actions.
Douglas is also sure to bring attention to the links between government and
private interests. Government officials influence policy, and leveraged state policy and
resources to their private interests. Alabama governor Robert M. Patton leased out
convicts to a cover company - legitimate on paper, but functions as a concealer - which
had called itself Smith and McMillan; the lease was controlled in part by a company that
Patton would become president of three years later, the Alabama and Chattanooga
Railroad. Former Confederate officials also engaged in the leasing. Politics leaned more
in the interests of commerce than protecting individual rights.

202

Alabama, a Domicile for Peonage
Like other Southern states, Alabama found itself before the Supreme Court o f the
United States quite a few times in the first half o f the twentieth century. Twice, Alabama
found itself before the federal court in 1903 for the Peonage Cases. Alabama also went
before the Court with respect to its handling of Bailey’s cases, once in 1908 and again in
1911. Again, Alabama found itself before the Court in United States v. Reynolds in 1914.
Alabama seemed to frequent the Supreme Court during the Progressive Era, primarily
because it enacted statutes that the Court found unconstitutional and in violation o f the
Reconstruction Amendments.

201 “Violation of Federal Peonage Laws by State Statutes,” Virginia Law Review 2, no. 5 (1915): 386-87.
202 Blackmon, 53-4.
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The courts in Alabama initially acted against statutes that regulated contractual
relations. In 1887, the Alabama Supreme Court heard two cases appealed from Pike
County on the same day, July 11. The first case, Smith v. State (1887), concerned a man
who was charged with violating a social law. Green Smith was tried and convicted for
using “abusive, insulting and obscene language” in the presence o f females. M.C.
Enfinger moved to be his surety for the fine o f $10 and court costs. Smith signed a
contract, which included in its provisions that he would have to work off the fine, court
costs and advances made to him before he could satisfy his debt and be released from
labor.203
The court ruled fines and costs are not included in the Alabama constitutional
definition of debt regarding the “imprisonment for debt” clause;204 therefore, the court
could have imprisoned Smith. However, the debt had been satisfied before the debtor
moved from the custody of the prosecutor to the custody o f the contracting master; the
remaining debt - advance - cannot be coerced upon the debtor. The court noted that
holding a convict until he has liquidated his debt is “imprisonment for debt” within the
constitutional meaning and illegal; thus, the holding Smith for the debt he owed for
advances constituted involuntary servitude. The court reversed the decision and
remanded it to the lower court.205

Wynn v. State (1887) was the second case the court heard. Monroe Wynn, a minor
was convicted on a charge of petit larceny. M. D. Floyd moved to be his surety to pay off
the fines and court costs that ensued. Wynn entered into a contract to work for Floyd until

203

S m ith v. S ta te , 82 Ala. 40, 41.

204

The clause expressed a violation of the law if one was imprisoned for a debt.
Ibid.

205
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he liquidated the debt. Wynn began his labor but not as efficiently as Floyd wanted. After
repeated attempts to have him do so, Floyd sought and attained a warrant for Wynn. The
court refused to observe that Wynn was a minor and had a right to not uphold the
contract. The court cited Smith , which it had ruled on earlier in the day, and maintained
that a person could not be held in service to liquidate debt for advances as doing so would
constitute involuntary servitude. The court also noted that the state law under which the
case was brought recognized leaving or escaping for service as a misdemeanor but make
no provision for inefficient service. The court reversed the decision, but did not remand
the case, and released Wynn.
Such judicial victories on behalf of debtors were short-lived. The social attitudes
of white-influenced government control over the black population in Alabama, as it
arguably had done in other Southern states. Whites viewed blacks as useful,
indispensable workers that lacked accountability and were irresponsible; they also viewed
blacks as creatures prone to criminal activity, if not employed. They acted in a manner
that discredited the honesty and integrity o f a black person’s testimony or accounts of
incidents, whether actively or passively.

Such attitudes and beliefs persisted from the

antebellum period through Reconstruction into the Progressive Era.
Reforms that came before the government in Birmingham contained four issues in
controversy regarding the “Negro Problem,” as Carl V. Harris puts it: 1) regulation of
black saloons; 2) vagrancy law enforcement; 3) government use o f the convict-labor

" ’ Wynn v. State, 82 Ala. 55.
207 Carl V. Harris, “Reforms in Government Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama, 1890-1920,”
The Journal o f Southern History 38, no. 4 (1972): 568.
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system; and 4) the county fee system.

Blacks had become a commodity to be fought

over by special interest groups, like an object fought over by children for possession,
each contending for their interest in what should be done with the object. The lawmakers
are like the parents or mediators, managing the allocation of the object to whoever comes
up with the most convincing argument or reason.
The growing industrial sector in Birmingham attracted black and white laborers
seeking employment. The large corporations depended on black laborers to perform
menial tasks - coal and ore mining and railroad construction among other jobs.209 The
economic structure included blacks at the base; socioeconomically, they were the wrung
of society.

Corporate and middle-class white interests aligned with strict enforcement

of vagrancy laws. Though labor union organized movements to combat strict
enforcement of vagrancy laws for fear o f the impact on all laborers, their attempts were
unsuccessful.211
World War I interrupted vagrancy law enforcement, which had become relaxed
due the war. Vagrancy enforcement resurged toward the end o f 1920. Vagrancy operated
as a mode for the disadvantaged to enter into convict-leasing. Convict-leasing programs
were supported by both the city and corporate interests. It covered the expenses accrued
for prison maintenance and care for the convicts. It also cost corporations less to lease
convicts than to hire free laborers.
Since the fees were used to pay civil servants o f the justice system and law
enforcement officials as well as witnesses came from the revenue brought in from
208
209
210
211

Ibid., 569.
Ibid., 570.
Ibid.
Ibid., 579-80.
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convict-leasing, it had been supported. However, support shifted in 1913 as convict
leasing revenue could no longer cover funds used to pay civil servants, law enforcement
officials and witnesses. Corporate interests moved from supporting the fee system to
developing and supporting an anti-fee system in Jefferson County, claiming that law
officials harassed black workers, which produced an adverse effect on the available black
laborer population.

717

Those with corporate interests were concerned with the availability o f cheap
labor. Those in the social environment were concerned with government control over
blacks. Amidst the clash, blacks became entangled in systems o f involuntary servitude to
protect the interests - social, economic and commercial - of the dominant white class.

Federal Cases Dealing with Peonage
The first case, United States v. Clyatt (1905) brought to the Supreme Court
regarding peonage had failed to produce a conviction; nonetheless, it was successful in
testing the constitutionality of the PAA.

The PAA proved valid and cases began to

appear before the Court. The background of the peonage landmark case, Bailey v.

Alabama (1911) is a storied one. Alonzo Bailey had brought suit before the Court once in
1908. He had been denied habeas corpus after being convicted o f violating an Alabama
statute that declared breach of a labor contract without having repaying the money as an
intent to defraud the employer and denied the defendant the opportunity to present their
testimony. The burden of proof had not lain on the prosecuting party since the act of
breach of contract without repaying the money served as prima facie evidence, which

2,2 Ibid., 582-599.
21J See generally Clyatt.
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made conviction easier. The law effectively circumvented due process by precluding a
defendant’s right to testify and defend himself.214
In the first case, Bailey v. Alabama (1908), the Court affirmed the judgment of the
Alabama Supreme Court. The Court heard Bailey as a writ o f error case, but determined
that Bailey’s treatment was not an error o f the court. It reasoned that the court could act
within its own volition to determine how it would precede to handle a case - denying the
writ of habeas corpus motioned on behalf of Bailey. The claim against the Alabama law
that had made criminal the contract breach - intent to defraud - lack sufficient evidence
for the Court to test the law.216 Therefore, Alabama was victorious this round; however,
Bailey and his support system refused to give up.
Bailey returned again in 1911 to the Supreme Court with his contender, Alabama.
The law that made intent to defraud prima facie evident or criminal intent was yet again
before the Court. The Court recognized that Bailey’s previous case was prematurely
brought before it, and intended to hear the case and review the constitutionality o f the
Alabama statute that placed Bailey in jail.216 Justice Hughes, who had delivered the
opinion, traced the intent of the law prior to and after amendment, noting that conviction
was difficult before amendment because intent to defraud needed to be proven. The lack
of direct evidence to make a judgment made indictment and conviction near impossible,
as a breach of contract did not constitute an intent to injure or defraud.217

214 Daniel, 67.
215 Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452, 452-55 (1908).
216 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 229 (1911). Justice Hughes recites the language regarding crime in the
Alabama statute: “And the refusal of any person who enters into such a contract to perform such an act or
service, or refund such money, or pay for such property without just cause, shall be prima facie evidence of
the intent to injure his employer, or to defraud him.”
217 Bailey, 232.
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After the amendments to the Alabama statute, the refusal or failure to pay back
money or perform service that one was contracted for constituted prima facie evidence
for intent to injure or defraud. The Court found that this was not invalid if the violator
was permitted the opportunity to testify on his or her own behalf.
Alabama statute denied Bailey testimony.

However, the

Such a statute was repugnant to the

Thirteenth Amendment and the PAA; the PAA also nullified laws that sought to submit a
person to peonage, which is what the Alabama stature effectively did."

Essentially, a

state could not utilize its police power to create laws that are intent upon providing a
nexus to slavery and involuntary servitude. Therefore, the Court nullified the Alabama
statute. Justice Holmes, who had delivered the opinion on Bailey’s first case in 1908,
held the position that the punishment exception clause permits states to enact statutes that
criminalize acquisition of money under false pretenses, thus, subjecting the convict to
slavery and involuntary servitude.

221

J.A. Reynolds along with B. W. Broughton appeared before a U.S. district court,
indicted for violation of the PAA. Reynolds and Brought were indicted for having held a
convict laborer, Ed Rivers (convicted for petit larceny), in a condition o f peonage.
Reynolds stood as surety for Rivers in court and paid his court costs and fees, assigned to
Rivers by the court in accordance with his conviction. Rivers entered a written contract
with Reynolds to perform labor for nine months and twenty-four days. He worked for one
month and two days, then refused to continue to perform labor. Reynolds petitioned the

2,8 Bailey, 236-39.
219 Bailey, 236.
22u Bailey, 240-45. Justice Homes notes that slavery meant more than chattel slavery, as the language was
adopted from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which guarantees the civil freedoms of all persons.
Furthermore, he states that involuntary servitude’s definition is broader than that of slavery.
221 Bailey, 245-50.
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county court for a warrant and one was issued for Rivers. Rivers was again before the
county court. This time, Broughton offered to be his surety and Rivers entered into a
contract with him for fourteen and one-half months. As with Rivers, Broughton stood as
surety for E. W. Fields, who had been convicted for selling a mortgaged property. Fields
entered into a written labor contract with for a term o f nine months and twenty-nine days.
He refused to labor after two months under this contract after allegedly enduring threats
of arrest and imprisonment. Broughton did as Reynolds had done and secured a warrant
for Fields, whereupon Fields was arrested. They were brought up on indictment charges;
however, the court found Reynolds and Broughton not guilty.

222

The Supreme Court reviewed this case as it had reviewed Bailey, ruling that states
cannot make laws to circumvent constitutional provisions and federal enactment;
moreover, states cannot pass laws that are repugnant to the Thirteenth Amendment and
the PAA, which was enacted to enforced the Thirteenth Amendment against peonage as a
form of involuntary servitude.

Justice Day, who delivered the opinion, identified the

criminal-surety system in the actions o f Reynolds, Broughton and the county court,
sanctioned by Alabama law and found it unconstitutional under Thirteenth Amendment
and the PAA. Justice Holmes, who had dissented in Bailey (1911), reluctantly agreed that
the criminal-surety system was unconstitutional.
A woman named Aurelia P. Bernal encountered another woman, Rosenda Nava.
Nava, a Mexican alien, had been employed as a domestic servant earning four dollars per
week in Laredo, Texas. Bernal, marketing herself as a small hotel proprietor in San
Antonio, Texas to Nava, offered employment as a chambermaid with a wage of six
222 United States v. Reynolds, 213 F. 352. See also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 138-40.
223 Reynolds, 235 U.S^ 133, 143-49.
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dollars per week, an increase of two dollars per week. She told her that if she had not
liked the work and wanted to leave, she would pay her fare back to Laredo. Nava
accepted the proposition and began employment.224
Bernal brought Nava to a brothel to perform acts o f prostitution. Nava refused to
perform acts of prostitution. Bernal refused to release her until she paid back the fare
from Laredo to San Antonio. She threatened that she would contact immigration and have
Nava taken into custody, whereupon she would serve five years in prison. Nava was able
to contact one of her cousins while out on errands. Her cousin sent a friend with a police
officer to Bernaf s brothel to seek out Nava. The friend and police requested Nava’s
presence and Bernal replied that no one by that name was there; however, Nava made
herself known and was taken from the brothel by the police officer and brought back to
her family.22'
While working for Bernal, Nava and another woman named Sofia Vivar
performed all of the domestic work. Nava was not given much to eat nor was she
compensated for the work she performed. In all, three women were in service to Bernal,
but Nava appeared to have been the only one coerced into service.226 A case was brought
Bernal for holding Nava in peonage. Bernal was convicted for having held Nava in a state
of peonage.-" In response, Bernal brought suit against the U.S. government, Bernal v.

United States (1917), claiming the court erred in its judgment. The court reviewed 11
assignments of error cited by Bernal, all of which were denied by the court. The court
affirmed the judgment of Bernal’s conviction.
224
225
226
227
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The federal courts had been presented with opportunities. In some instances, it
restricted its ability due to lack of evidence or technicality. Nevertheless, there were some
victories for victims of peonage. The courts had proven that justice could be served for
victims of peonage. How long it would hear peonage cases was a different matter
entirely.

Peonage After 1920
States actively sought to undermine the federal government's enforcement of the
law. Throughout the 1910s and even in the 1920s, the Court had taken an active role in
striking down laws and convicting violators that contributed to the plague o f peonage.
However, as implied by Daniel, the fire that burned so bright during the 1910s and the
1920s had been dampened, and over time, it had extinguished. Resources had to be
allocated elsewhere and the hope of eradicating peonage entirely had been oversight^Peonage had to be rooted from the tucked away pockets of the Deep South. That was an
impossible task.

Conclusion
The inquiry that this thesis has investigated - Was it possible that states may
manipulate through legislative enactments to punish via crime a target population and
submit them to slavery and involuntary servitude? - has argued that it was indeed
possible. It is implied in the sources reviewed that states in the South accomplished this
feat. Peonage ran rampant across the South in three areas: the cotton belt, the turpentine
228

Daniel, 147-48, 190-91.
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area and railroad construction lines. Laborers became peons through the means o f
contracts enforced by labor-contract statutes. Laborers also became peons through
convict-leasing. They were often brought up on vagrancy or minor criminal infractions
and leased to corporations. Vagrancy, protected fiercely by the states, often created legal
entry way into peonage, convict-leasing and criminal-surety. Criminal statues were
enacted as part a broader scheme in the South to uphold and maintain white supremacy.
Social laws were enacted to uphold the sanctity o f white women while devaluing black
women into sexual deviants that lacked legal protection as well as other laws that
prescribed racial etiquette, leveraged against blacks and supported white supremacy.
They were also enacted to ensnare immigrants within the systems o f forced labor, though
the focus was primarily on blacks.
Was there any motivation for it? Racial oppression and socioeconomic hierarchy
protection and reinforcement as well as economic hardship motivated the persistence of
involuntary servitude in various forms. Government officials who had not believe blacks
to be their equals were adamant about maintaining the pre-Civil War social hierarchy;
moreover, blacks were perceived as revolting, criminally inclined, evil creatures that
needed white supervision. Justification for abuses stemmed from recollections of slavery
- its social acceptance and legal enforcement. Involuntary servitude was another means
by which they could relive slavery and retain their superiority. Cheap labor often led
planters and industrialist to seek out convicts for lease. They were also inclined to seek
out immigrants for the same purpose. Moreover, the convict-leasing and peonage
provided labor and funds to private actors and governments, respectively.
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States enacted laws that criminalized black life, threatened whites that went
against it and trapped immigrants as they were a source of cheap labor. Blacks happened
to be the primary targets. Whether expressed or implied, this inquiry has revealed that a
possibility to exploit the punishment exception clause to punish a target population exists.
Stronger is the support that states had manipulated the punishment exception clause.

Clyatt, Bailey, Reynolds and Papachristou are examples of cases that discovered state
sponsorship and permission of involuntary servitude in its various forms. The accounts
discussed in this thesis represent a small number o f cases, though most were unrecorded
or received and never examined. Nonetheless, involuntary servitude existed, largely
through criminal sanction, at great benefit to the governments and industrial-commercial
interests of the South.
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Appendix I
From Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 1489-1490.

The amendment proposed by Senator Saulsbury is as follows:
Sec. 1. All persons shall have the right peaceably to assemble and worship God according
to the dictates of their own conscience.
Sec. 2. The use of the public press shall not be obstructed; but criminal publications made
in one State against the lawful institutions o f another State shall not be allowed.
Sec. 3. The right of citizens to free and lawful speech in public assemblies shall not be
denied. Access of citizens to the ballot box shall not be obstructed either by civil or
military power. The military shall always be subordinate to the existing judicial authority
over citizens. The privilege o f the writ o f habeas corpus shall never be suspended in the
presence of the judicial authority.
Sec. 4. The militia of a State or of the United States shall not be employed to invade the
lawful rights of the people of any of the several States; but the United States shall not be
hereby deprived of the right and power to defend and protect its property and rights
within the limits of any o f the States.
Sec. 5. Persons held to service or labor for life, in any State under the laws thereof, may
be taken into any Territory of the United States south o f north latitude 36° 30', and the
right to such service or labor shall not be impaired thereby, and the territorial Legislature
thereof shall have the exclusive right to make and shall make all needful rules and
regulations for the protection of such right and also for the protection of such persons; but
Congress or any territorial Legislature shall not have power to impair or abolish such
right of service in the said Territory while in a territorial condition without the consent of
all the States, south of said latitude, which maintain such service.
Sec. 6. Involuntary servitude, except for crime, shall not be permanently established
within the District set apart from the Seat o f government o f the United States; but the
right of sojourn in such District with persons held to service or labor for life, shall not be
denied.
Sec. 7. When any territory of the United States south of north latitude 36° 30' shall have a
population equal to the ratio of representation for one member o f Congress, and the
people thereof shall have formed a constitution for a republican form o f government, it
shall be admitted as a State into the Union, on an equal footing with the other States; and
the people may, in such constitution, either prohibit or sustain the right to involuntary
labor or service, and alter or amend the constitution at their will.
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Sec. 8. The present right of representation in section two, article one, o f this Constitution,
shall not be altered without the consent o f all the States maintaining the right to
involuntary service or labor south o f latitude 36° 30', but nothing in this Constitution or
its amendments shall be construed to deprive any State south o f said latitude 36° 30' o f
the right of abolishing involuntary servitude at its will.
Sec. 9. The regulation and control o f the right to labor or service in any o f the States
south of latitude 36° 30' is hereby recognized to be exclusively the right o f each State
within its own limits; and this Constitution shall not be altered or amended to impair this
right o f each State without its consent; Provided, This article shall not be construed to
absolve the United States from rendering assistance to suppress insurrections or domestic
violence, when called upon by any State, as provided in section four, article four, o f this
Constitution.
Sec. 10.
No State shall pass any law in any way interfering with or obstructing the
recovery of fugitives from justice, or from labor or service, or any law o f Congress made
under article four, section two, of this Constitution; and all laws in violation o f this
Section may, on complaint made by any person or State, be declared void by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Sec. 11.
A sa right of comity between the several States south o f latitude 36° 30’
the right of transit with persons held to involuntary labor or service from one State to
another shall not be obstructed, but such persons shall not be brought into the States north
o f said latitude.
Sec. 12.
The traffic in slaves with Africa is hereby forever prohibited on pain of
death and the forfeiture of all the rights and property o f persons engaged therein; and the
descendants o f Africans shall not be citizens.
Sec. 13.
Alleged fugitives from labor or service, on request, shall have a trial by
jury before being returned.
Sec. 14.
All alleged fugitives charged with crime committed in violation o f the law
of a State shall have the right of trial by jury, and if such person claims to be a citizen of
another State, shall have a right o f appeal or o f a writ o f error to the Supreme Court o f the
United States.
Sec. 15.
All acts of any inhabitant of the United States tending to incite persons
held to service or labor to insurrection or acts o f domestic violence, or to abscond are
hereby prohibited and declared to be a penal offense; and all the courts o f the United
States shall be open to suppress and punish such offenses at the suit o f any citizen o f the
United States or the suit of any State.
Sec. 16.
All conspiracies in any State to interfere with lawful rights in any other
State, or against the United States, shall be suppressed; and no State, or the people
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thereof, shall withdraw from this Union without the consent of three-fourths o f all the
States, expressed by an amendment proposed and ratified in the manner provided in
article five o f the Constitution.
Sec. 17.
Whenever any State wherein involuntary servitude is recognized or
allowed shall propose to abolish such Servitude, and shall apply for pecuniary assistance
therein, the Congress may in its discretion grant such relief not exceeding one hundred
dollars for each person liberated. But Congress shall not propose such abolishment or
relief to any State.
Congress may assist free persons o f African descent to emigrate and colonize
Africa.
Sec. 18.
Duties on imports may the imposed for revenue; but shall not be excessive
or prohibitory in amount.
Sec. 19.
When all of the several States shall have abolished slavery, then and
thereafter slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall never
be established or tolerated in any o f the States or Territories o f the United States, and
they shall be forever free.
Sec. 20.
The provisions of this article relating to involuntary labor or servitude
shall not be altered without the consent of all the States maintaining such servitude.
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Appendix II
The table provided the dates of ratification by the states up until the date of
constitutional adoption, December 6, 1865.229
Table 2 Thirteenth Amendment Ratification

Table 2
Numerical
order of
ratification
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Thirteenth Amendment Ratification by
State
State
Illinois
Rhode Island
Michigan
Maryland
New York
Pennsylvania
West Virginia
Missouri
Maine
Kansas
Massachusetts
Virginia
Ohio
Indiana
Nevada
Louisiana
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Vermont
Tennessee
Arkansas
Connecticut

Date o f Ratification
Feb 1,1865
Feb 2, 1865
Feb 3, 1865
Feb 3, 1865
Feb 3, 1865
Feb 3, 1865
Feb 3, 1865
Feb 6, 1865
Feb 7, 1865
Feb 7, 1865
Feb 7, 1865
Feb 9, 1865
Feb 10, 1865
Feb 13, 1865
Feb 16, 1865
Feb 17, 1865
Feb 23, 1865
Feb 24, 1865
Mar 8, 1865
Apr 7, 1865
Apr 14, 1865
May 4, 1865

229 U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation,
Centennial Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,” report prepared by
the Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 30. Oregon, California, Florida, Iowa, New
Jersey, Texas, Delaware, Kentucky and Mississippi ratified the amendment after the three-fourths
ratification threshold was met. Mississippi was the last state to ratify. Although, its legislature ratified the
amendment in 1995, the notification was not received by the archivist until 2012, which officially marks
the state’s ratification.
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23
24
25
26
27

New
Hampshire
South
Carolina
Alabama
North
Carolina
Georgia

Jul 1, 1865
Nov 13, 1865
Dec 2, 1865
Dec 4, 1865
Dec 6, 1865

Table 2

Adapted from The Constitution o f the United States o f America: Analysis and Interpretation, Centennial
Edition, “Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America,” report prepared by the
Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: 2013), 30.
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Additional Primary Sources can be viewed at Alabama Department o f Archives and
History. “Using Primary Sources in the Classroom: Reconstruction Unit.“ May 23, 2012,
http://www.archives.alabama.gov/teacher/recon/reconl.html.

